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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade there has been a widespread and growing
dissatisfaction with the performance of American public schools.'
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1. While the forums for the expression of this public mood have ranged from
school board meetings to popular news magazines, from the halls of Congress to
scholarly journals, the message has remained the same---dissatisfaction. See, e.g.,
Suing for Not Learning, TIME, Mar. 3, 1975, at 73; Saxe, Malpractice in the Classrooms, Newsday, Nov. 30, 1976, at 49, col. 1; Suing the Teacher, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3,
1977, at 101; Baratz & Hartle, Malpractice in the Schools, PROGRESSIVE, June, 1977,
at 33-34; Hentoff, Who's to Blame? The Politics of EducationalMalpractice,LEARNING, Oct. 1977, at 40; 124 CONG. REC. S14862 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1978) (remarks of
Sen. Proxmire); Stull, Why Johnny Can't Read-His Own Diploma, 10 PAc. L.J. 647
(1979).
In 1978 CBS News broadcast a three-part documentary on the poor academic
performance of American public school students, "Is Anyone Out There Learning?" A pool conducted in conjunction with the programs revealed a general public belief that the schools were incompetent. For example, of those polled 41%
responded that their children were receiving a poorer education than they themselves had received. While there was also a feeling that the permissiveness of society and the influence of television were responsible for the country's educational
problems, the schools were specifically indicted for inept teaching, poor discipline,
and unnecessarily lenient promotion policies. See 124 CONG. REC. S14862 (daily
ed. Sept. 11, 1978).
Some states have taken action to correct the perceived educational inadequacies. See note 298 infra. In New York, for example, a commission was appointed
to study and report on the quality, cost, and financing of elementary and secondary education in the state and to make recommendations for improving the
schools in all of these areas. See NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON THE QUALrry,
COST AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN NEW YORK
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In part, this disenchantment may stem from an unarticulated opposition to the schools' having adopted, albeit under the imperative of judicial mandate, a social corrective, as opposed to
educative, role. 2 Some of the most vehement attacks upon the
competency and quality of public education, however, have arisen
from those very groups which are allegedly most benefited by the
schools' change in functional emphasis. 3 In either case, the
schools remain under attack.
A particularly effective appeal in this attack has been the call
for "accountability" in education. 4 While considerable disagreement exists over what is meant by "accountability" and to whom
the schools should be accountable, 5 state legislators, local school
boards, community groups, and even teachers themselves have all
declared (not surprisingly) that they are in favor of "accountabil6
ity."
This demand for accountability is especially powerful when

linked with legitimate public concern for the problem of "funcSTATE, THE FLEISCHMANN REPORT ON THE QUALrrY, COST AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN NEW YORK STATE (1973) [hereinafter cited

as FLEISCHmAN REPORT]. The result of the study, however, was to adopt a system
of minimum competency testing. These tests are to evaluate each student's proficiency in reading, writing, and mathematics. A student is required to pass the
tests before being permitted to graduate from high school. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,
1979, § A, at 19, col. 2-3; id., Jan. 28, 1979, § D, at 12, col. 1. Regarding the theoretical
and practical shortcomings of minimum competency tests, see notes 294-305 infra
and accompanying text.
For a comparative perspective on the problem, see Owen, Tort Liability in German School Law, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 72 (1955); Whincup, What Should be
Taught in School?, 127 NEW. L.J. 1020 (1977) (United Kingdom).
2. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717 (1974). See generally Wilkinson, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School
Superintendent, 1975 SuP. CT. REV. 25; K. ALEXANDER (ed.), SCHOOL LAW (1980).
3. E.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d
929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Robinson v. Cahill, 62
N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Sugarman, Accountability through the Courts, 82 SCHOOL REV. 233
(1974); Levin, A Conceptual Frameworkfor Accountability in Education, id., at
363; Aaron, Evaluation and Accountability, in NEW HoRIzoNs IN READING 558
(1976); L. STRAIN, ACCOUNrABILrrY IN READING INSTRUCTION (1976).
The origins of the "accountability" movement may be traced to President
NLxon's often expressed position that educators should be held responsible for
their performance. See L. BROWDER, AMERICAN ASSOCLATION OF SCHOOL ADMImsTRATORS, AN ADMINISTRATOR'S HANDBOOK ON EDUCATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 10

(1975); R. STICKLAND, J. PHILLIPS & W. PHILLIPS, AVOIDING TEACHER MALPRACTICE:
PRACTICAL LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR THE TEACHING PROFESSIONAL 63 (1976).
5. See Bettinhaus & Miller, Reactions to State Accountability Programs,in A
DISSEMINATION SYSTEM FOR STATE ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAMS 5-12 (Cooperative
Accountability Project 1973).
6. But see Hentoff, supra note 1, at 43 (teacher unionization seen as a means
for avoiding accountability).
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tional illiteracy."7 Given consistently declining scores on nationally standardized tests, it would appear that more and more
pupils are learning less and less. Allegedly, "it is not uncommon
today for a student enrolled in a public school to move through
the system without acquiring basic skills such as the ability to
8
read and write."
One by-product of this growing number of uneducated graduates has been a burgeoning legal literature on the subject of educational malpractice. 9 Taken as a whole this body of legal
commentary manifests two striking characteristics. First of all, it
is vastly disproportionate to the number of actually decided cases.
While there are numerous law review articles, notes, and comments in the educational malpractice area, there have been but a
handful of decisions, only three of which are fully reported.10
7. See Note, EducationalMalpractice: Can the JudiciaryRemedy the Growing Problem of Functional Illiteracy?, 13 SuFFOLK U.L. REV. 27 (1979); Note, The
ABC's of Duty: EducationalMalpracticeand the FunctionallyIlliterateStudent, 8
GOLDEN GATE U.L REV. 293 (1978). Exactly what constitutes "functional illiteracy"
is subject to some debate. The New York State Commission on the Quality, Cost
and Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education defined a "functional literate" as a person able to read materials at a tenth to twelfth grade reading level
One unable to read at that level was, thus, by definition "functionally illiterate." 2
FEImsCHMANx REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. Among the materials that the Fleischmann Commission felt a "functional literate" should be able to read and comprehend were driving manuals, "how to" instructions for home repair projects, and
the income tax directions. Some, including second year law students enrolled in
Tax I, may find this an unreasonably rigorous standard of functional literacy.
8. Comment, EducationalNegligence: A Student's Cause of Action for Incompetent Academic Instruction, 58 N.C. L. REV. 561 (1980).
9. E.g., Comment, EducationalMalpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?, 7 FonO5.
URB. L.J. 117 (1979); Note, Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District: New
York Chooses Not to Recognize "EducationalMalpractice," 43 ALB. L. REV. 339
(1979); Note, EducationalMalfeasance: A New Cause of Action for Failureto Educate?, 14 TULSA W. 383 (1978); Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational
Harms Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1978);
Comment, EducationalMalpractice, 124 U. PA. L REV. 755 (1976); Note, Educational Malpractice: Can the JudiciaryRemedy the Growing Problemof Functional
Illiteracy?, 13 SuFFOL U. L REV. 27 (1979); Comment, supra note 8.
10. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1976); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99
(1978), rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979); Donohue v.
Copiague Union Free School Dist., 95 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S.2d 584,(1977), affd, 64
App. Div. 2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), affd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418
N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979). The unreported decisions are McNeil v. Board of Educ., No. L17207-74 (Super. Ct. Law Div. N.J. May 31, 1974), reportedin Elson, supra note 9, at
n.4, Garrett v. School Bd. of Broward County, No. 77-8703 (Cir. Ct. Fla. Dec. 5,
1977), reported in 10 EDUC. U.BuLL. 475 (1977), and Doe v. Board of Educ., No.
48277 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County Md. July 6,1979), reported in Comment, supra
note 8, at nn. 1 &3.

Second, the commentary is uniformly enthusiastic for the recognition of some form of judicial remedy for a failure to educate.
Malpractice in other professions has been found to be legally
compensable; so, it is reasoned, malpractice in education should
be treated no differently."
The idea is that the educator (individually, collectively, or institutionally)1 2 has some legal obligation to carry out the function of
11. The argument seems to be that, since malpractice actions are increasing in
other professions, it is simply anomalous that educators shouldn't be subjected to
such litigation too. See, e.g., Note, Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District. New York Chooses Not to Recognize "EducationalMalpractice," 43 ALB. L.
REv. 339, 358 (1979). As can readily be seen this is not a particularly compelling
piece of logic, requiring as it does several critical assumptions of both fact and policy. Moreover, there is some reason for doubting the efficacy or desirability of judicial intervention in other professional malpractice areas. See notes 245 & 283-85
infra and accompanying text. So, the argument may cut in just the opposite direction from that intended by the proponents of a cause of action for educational malpractice. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 161-66 (4th ed. 1971); T.
ROADY & W. ANDERSEN (eds.), PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE (1960).
Perhaps a more persuasive analogy would be to products liability. There, in response to societal demand, the courts eventually fashioned a new cause of action.
Initially, recognition of the new liability was based on a variety of theories: negligence, warranty, fraud, misrepresentation, and nuisance. But today the products
liability cause of action is almost universally accepted. See W. PROSSER, THE LAw
OF TORTS 641-82 (4th ed. 1971). At most, however, all the products liability analogy
stands for is that the law of torts is evolutionary. It offers no guidance as to when
or why a new tort should be recognized and, thus, is of limited utility in determining whether educational malpractice is an appropriate candidate for such recogni-

tion.
12. The named defendants in educational malpractice actions are usually the
local school board and its officials, rather than individual teachers. In medical malpractice actions, however, to which educational malpractice advocates often refer,
see note 11 supra, individual physicians are often named. Moreover, in many of
the examples of educational malpractice given by these advocates, it is the conduct of an individual instructor that allegedly causes the harm suffered by the
malpractice victim; see, e.g., Elson, supra note 9, at 648, 659 & 667. No logical reason exists, therefore, for precluding individual teacher liability. But see note 272
infra.
Whatever the teacher's liability, the local school district would be liable, either
for improper hiring, see RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965), or under
the doctrine of respondeatsuperior,see W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 458-91. See
also Mancke, Liability of School Districtsfor the Negligent Acts of Their Employees, 1 J. L. & EDUC. 109 (1972).
In the reported cases, see note 10 supra, the doctrine of governmental immunity
has not been an issue, and it is assumed for purposes of this article that educational malpractice actions will not be barred by immunity. For discussion of the
doctrine in the context of education, see Annot., 33 A.LL3d 703 (1970) (modern
status of doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to public schools and institutions of higher education); 38 A.L.R.3d 480 (1971) (immunity of private schools and
institutions of higher learning from liability in tort). See also Comment, Educational Malpractice, 124 U. PA. L REv. 755, 766-67, 769 (1976).
The modern trend has been toward the abrogation of governmental and related
LAw OF THE SEVENrrs § 25.04, at 554-57
immunities. K. DAvis, ADmiNisTRATI
(1976). Generally, this abrogation has been accomplished by legislation, although
in some jurisdictions it has been conditioned on the availability of insurance; see,
e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.96 (Supp. 1977) (waiving tort immunity of all
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academic instruction in such a manner as to impart some minimal
level of competence in basic subjects to the student.13 Identifying
state's political subdivisions); Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1403 (1959) (waiver of immunity to extent of policy). But in some states the doctrine of governmental immunity has been abolished by judicial action, e.g., Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist.,
55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).
The United States Supreme Court has itself accelerated this trend, significantly
for the purpose of this article, in decisions rejecting immunity for school officials
for the violation of students' civil rights. For example, in Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975), the Court observed, "[I]mmunity would not be justified since it
would not sufficiently increase the ability of school officials to exercise their discretion in a forthright manner to warrant the absence of a remedy for students
subjected to intentional or otherwise inexcusable deprivations." Id. at 320 (footnote omitted). See also Comment, Immunity of Teachers, School Board Members,
and School Districtsfor Suit Under Section 1983 of Civil Rights Act, 1976 U. ILL. L.
F. 1129; Yudof, Liabilityfor ConstitutionalTorts and the Risk-Averse Public School
Official, 49 So. CAL. L. REV. 1322 (1976). See generally B. FEIN, SINIIcANT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1978-1979 TERM 12-16, 98-105 (1980).
Only a few states, however, have statutorily provided for direct actions against
school districts for damages caused by their boards, officers, agents, or employees.
Ripps, The Tort Liability of the Classroom Teacher, 9 AKRON L. REV. 19, 20 (1975).
13. Actually, the claims of educational malpractice that have so far been urged
upon the courts reveal that the cause of action evisioned might be broader than
the statement in the text suggests. In some instances the allegation has been that
it was educational malpractice to push a student through school on the basis of
merely social promotions, allowing that student to graduate though deficient in basic skills. E.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814,
131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976). In other cases, just the opposite has been contended; educational malpractice has been seen in a failure to advance a student to a level of
instruction which he was capable of comprehending. Hoffman v. Board of Educ.,
64 App. Div. 2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978), rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424
N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979).
A basic and continuing confusion exists as to whether the essence of educational malpractice consists of misfeasance-the improper performance of the educative function-or of nonfeasance-the omission of the performance. Compare
Note, supra note 11, at 339, with Comment, EducationalMalpractice: When Can
Johnny Sue?, 7 FORD UPs. L. J. 117, 119 n.12. In fact, the distinction is not particularly helpful in analyzing claims of educational malpractice. See Hoffman v. Board
of Educ., 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 388-89, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 118 (1978) (Damiani, J., dissenting). See also note 56 infra.
Nor are these the only disagreements among those who would have the courts
recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice. In discussing the elements of educational malpractice, its proponents sometimes seem to mean that
the schools are teaching the wrong subjects. See, e.g., Comment, EducationalMalpractice, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 801-02 (1976). At other times, they appear to mean
that the schools are adopting the wrong pedagogical strategies. See, e.g., Elson,
supra note 9, at 746-54. Thus, it is unclear whether the schools are to be held liable for teaching an improper curriculum, albeit effectively, or for teaching appropriate subjects but utilizing methods that fail to convey those subjects
adequately-or for both.
As will be suggested, see notes 287 & 288 infra and accompanying text, this
amorphous nature of the proposed cause of action is an argument against its recognition by the courts.

the source of that obligation, however, has presented both commentators and counsel for the inadequately educated plaintiffs
with great difficulty. To overcome this obstacle, they have generated a number of alternative theories of recovery. Some writers,
analogizing the public schools to mental hospitals, have argued
that a student who is forcibly confined to a classroom without being offered adequate instruction (treatment) is unconstitutionally
deprived of liberty without due process of law.14 Others, alleging
the existence of a contract either between the student and the
school or between the taxpayers and the school system, of which
the student would be a third-party beneficiary, have suggested a
contract-based theory of recovery.15 A third view has been that,
at least where the student has received report cards showing satisfactory progress, an action for intentional misrepresentation
may lie.16 The most popular theory has been that, through either
misfeasance or nonfeasance, the failure to educate constitutes
some form of professional negligence which is remediable under
traditional tort principles.17 So far, none of these theories has
been successful in actual litigation.18
This article will examine the present case law on educational
malpractice. It will then analyze each of the principal theoretical
bases that have been advanced to support an educational malpractice cause of action: contract, misrepresentation, constitutional right, and negligence.19 It is the article's thesis that, for one
reason or another, each of these theories is logically unsound and
inadequate to support the desired cause of action. In each case,
the theory advanced either proceeds from an inapposite analogy
or requires an unjustified extension or distortion of present doctrine. Moreover, even if a legally sufficient justification for recognizing a cause of action for educational malpractice could be
found, compelling considerations of public policy argue against
such recognition. These considerations will be surveyed in the
14. Comment, EducationalMalpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?, 7 FoRD. URB.
L. J. 117, 121 (1979); Note, supra note 11, at 356-57.
15. Note, supra note 11, at 357; Note, EducationalMalfeasance: A New Cause
of Action for Failureto Educate?, 14 TULSA L.J. 383, 401 (1978).
16. Comment, supra note 8, at 561, n.2; see also Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 CaL App. 3d 814, 827, 131 CaL Rptr. 854, 862-63 (1976).
17. E.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 564-86; Elson, supra note 9, at 693-768.
18. See note 10 supra.
19. Still other possible theories of recovery that have been advanced are an intentional tort action similar to intentional infliction of emotional distress or, where
available, a petition for mandamus. Comment, EducationalMalpractice, 124 U.
PA. L. REV. 755, 781-82 (intentional tort), 789-90 (mandamus) (1976). However, because either of these avenues of recovery, if available at all, could be pursued in
only a very limited number of situations, they will not be considered further in
this article.
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concluding section of this article together with their implications
for future judicial developments in this area.20
20. The scope of this article is limited to a consideration of the various theoretical bases advanced to support a cause of action for educational malpractice in
academic instruction and counselling of students enrolled in elementary and secondary public schools. Issues arising in the context of private education, where
contract may play a more important role, are not discussed. See, e.g., Pietro v. St.
Joseph's School, 48 U.S.L.W. 2229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk County, Sept. 21, 1979)
(dismissal of educational malpractice claim against private school by trial court,
but recognizing that a parent might be entitled to recover tuition if the school
breached an express contractual agreement with the parent that the student
would attain a certain proficiency level after completing a specified curriculum).
See generally Comment, supra note 19, at 801-03; Annot., 38 A.LR.3d 480 (1971).
Also not addressed are questions of liability presented in claims against institutions, public or private, of higher education. See Lowenthal v. Vanderbilt Univ.,
No. A-8525 (Ch. Nashville, Tenn., Aug. 15, 1977) (university breached contractual
obligation by its failure to provide necessary faculty and funding to continue doctoral program); Ianniello v. University of Bridgeport, No. 10009 (C.P. Conn., June 7,
1977) (denying recovery of tuition for an unsatisfying class); Trustees of Columbia
Univ. v. Jacobsen, 31 N.J. 221, 156 A.2d 251 (1959) (affirming dismissal of misrepresentation claim against university for failure to inculcate truth and wisdom), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 808 (1960). See generally Russell, Goal Accountability in Higher
Education: Towards a Comprehensive Legal Conception of the University, 7 J. L. &
EDuc. 507 (1978); Note, Consumer Protectionand Higher Education-StudentSuits
Against Schools, 37 Omo ST. L.J. 608 (1976); Annot., 86 A.LR.2d 489 (1962).
The tort liability of public educators for physical injuries to elementary or secondary school pupils is also beyond the scope of this article. It should be noted,
however, that in many of these cases liability has been found to arise from negligent instruction. See, e.g., Matteuci v. High School Dist., 4 Ill. App. 3d 710, 281
N.E.2d 383 (1972) (physical injuries resulting from negligent instruction in the use
of dangerous machinery); Engel v. Gosper, 71 N.J. Super. 573, 177 A.2d 595 (1962)
(death caused by negligent instruction in the use of rockets); La Valley v. Stanford, 272 App. Div. 183, 70 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1947) (physical injuries received in boxing
match after physical education teacher failed to instruct in defensive measures);
Gardner v. State, 281 N.Y. 212, 22 N.E.2d 344 (1939) (physical injuries sustained in
gym class resulting from negligent instruction in customary gymnastic techniques). See generally Ripps, supra note 12; Drowatsky, On the FiringLine: Negligence in PhysicalEducation, 6 J. L. & EDUC. 481 (1977); Comment, 19 WASHBURN
L. J. 189 (1979); Comment, 19 SANTA CLARA L REV. 1125 (1979). The cases are collected in Annot., 35 A.LR.3d 758 (1971) (tort liability of public schools for accidents
associated with chemistry experiments, shopwork, and manual or vocational training); Annot., 36 A.L.R3d 361 (1971) (tort liability of public schools for accidents occurring in physical education classes); Annot., 38 A.LR.3d 830 (1971) (tort liability
of public schools for injuries resulting from lack or insufficiency of supervision).
In the educational malpractice actions, however, these cases have invariably been
construed as limited to their facts, holding only that public school authorities have
a duty to exercise reasonable care for the physical safety of students under their
supervision. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App.
3d 814, 821, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 858 (1976).
Finally, this article does not attempt to address the related question of the public schools' duty to meet the educational needs of "special students." See, e.g.,
Gary W. v. State, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (El). La. 1976) (ordering plans for appropriate

II.

THE CASE LAW

To date, the courts have been uniform in their reluctance to recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice, no matter on
what theory the claim has been predicated.2 ' In Peter W. v. San
Francisco Unified School District, the California appellate court
unanimously affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the suit for
failure to state a cause of action.22 Relying on public policy, the
New York Court of Appeals, although accepting the possibility
that such a cause might be properly pleaded, rejected a similar
action in Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District.23 And

in Hoffman v. Board of Education the same New York Court of
Appeals refused to permit recovery in a case that might easily
have been distinguished from the two earlier educational mal24
practice suits.

Peter W. was the first and perhaps most widely publicized suit
for non-learning. The plaintiff had attended the elementary and
secondary schools operated by the defendant district. Although
recently graduated from high school, he alleged that the district
and its employees had negligently failed to provide him with adequate instruction, guidance, counseling, and supervision in basic
academic skills, such as reading and writing. His teachers had instead, he maintained, allowed him to pass from one grade level to
another even though they knew or should have known that he
lacked the skills requisite for such advancement. As a result, he
had been permitted to graduate from high school even though unable to read beyond the eighth grade level. This reading disability, plaintiff claimed, rendered him unable to gain meaningful
to recover general damages for this
employment, and he sought
"permanent disability," 25 as well as special damages incurred as
the cost of compensatory tutoring. The school district's liability
for these damages was, according to the plaintiff, the product of
education for mentally retarded, physically handicapped, and delinquent children
as required by a due process right to adequate treatment); Mills v. Board of Educ.,
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (excluding "special students" from school violates
due process). See generally Note, The Right of HandicappedChildren to an Education: The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 519 (1974).
21. See Annot., 1 A.L.R4th 1139 (1980) (tort liability of public schools and institutions of higher learning for educational malpractice). The paucity of decisional guidance in this area may be suggested by the fact that this annotation, the
American Law Report's first on the subject, is but four pages in length.
22. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
23. 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979), afg 64 App. Div. 2d
29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), affg 95 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1977).
24. 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979), revVg 64 App. Div. 2d
369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978).
25. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 818, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 856 (1976).
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either its negligence or its misrepresentation of his level of academic achievement.
As to the negligence claim, the court concluded that there was
no duty of care on the part of the school district or its employees
toward the plaintiff on which to base a negligence cause of action.
This conclusion being "dispositive" of the negligence action,26 the
court did not address other negligence issues presented by the
plaintiff's pleading. It did, however, indicate by way of dicta that
it entertained serious doubt as to whether a workable standard of
care could ever be conceived to apply to such an action. It also
questioned whether the plaintiff had suffered any injury within
the meaning of the law of negligence; and, even if injury had been
sustained, it suggested there was an insufficient causal link between the defendant's negligence, if any, and the plaintiffs disa27
bility.
The court's discussion of the legal question of the existence of a
duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff was inextricably
linked with its consideration of broader issues of public policy.
"[I]t should be recognized," the court wrote, "that 'duty' is not
sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of
those considerationsof policy which lead the law to say that the
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.' ' 28 Ironically, the
court found support for its position in Rowland v. Christian, the
pathbreaking California Supreme Court decision that had rejected the common law categories to determine the legal duties
owed by owners and occupiers of land to those who came upon
that land.29 Language in Rowland had stated the "fundamental
principle" of tort liability that "all persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others being injured by their conduct" except where a departure from this principle was "clearly
supported by public policy."3 0 Taking this as its starting point,
the Peter W. court then proceeded to identify those policy factors
pertinent to a determination of duty:
The social utility of the activity out of which the injury arises, compared
26. Id. at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
27. Id. at 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. 860-61.
28. Id., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860, quoting Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72, 76, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (1968), quoting W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 332-33
(3d ed. 1964) (emphasis added in Peter W.). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 11,
at 325-26.
29. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
30. Id. at 112, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100, 443 P.2d at 564.

with the risks involved in its conduct; the kind of person with whom the
actor is dealing; the workability of a rule of care, especially in terms of the
parties' relative ability to adopt practical means of preventing injury; the
relative ability of the parties to bear the financial burden of injury and the
availability of means by which the loss may be shifted or spread; ...
[and] in the case of a public agency defendant, the extent of its powers,
the role imposed upon it by law and the limitations imposed upon it by
budget
. . . are . .. factors which play a role in the determination of
31
duty.

Examining allegations of educational malpractice in light of these
factors, the court concluded that the very context out of which
such suits would arise was an argument against allowing the
cause of action.
Rightly or wrongly, but widely, [those persons and agencies who administer the academic phases of the public educational process] are charged
with outright failure in the achievement of their educational objectives;
according to some critics, they bear responsibility for many of the social
and moral problems of our society at large. Their public plight in these
respects is attested in the daily media, in bitter governing board elections,
rejections of school bond proposals, and in survey upon surin wholesale
32
vey.

In such an atmosphere, to hold school districts, administrators,
and teachers to an actionable duty of care in the discharge of
their academic functions would, in the court's judgment, expose
educators to countless tort claims, both real and feigned, brought
by disaffected students and parents. The ultimate consequences,
in terms of time and money, would burden public education beyond calculation.
The court recognized that tort law is an evolutionary phenomenon and that, from time to time, new areas of liability have been
sanctioned.33 But it noted that in those areas
the wrongs and injuries involved were both comprehensible and assessable within the existing judicial framework. . . . This is simply not true of
wrongful conduct and injuries allegedly involved in educational malfeasance. Unlike the activity of the highway or the marketplace, classroom
methodology affords no readily acceptable standards of care, cause, or injury.34
31. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859, quoting Raymond v. Paradise
Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8-9, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851 (1963).
32. Id. at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. 861.
33. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Silizinoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240
P.2d 282 (1952) (intentional infliction of mental distress); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d
728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968) (negligent infliction of emotional distress
upon a third party observer); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
443 P.2d 561 (1968) (rejection of common law categories for determination of legal
duty of owners and occupiers of land); Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 13 Cal. 3d 177, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 529 P.2d 553 (1974) (psychotherapist's duty to
warn one endangered by physician's patient).
34. Peter'W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 860. Interestingly, the court chose to characterize the plaintiff's
claim as one involving malfeasance-the performance of an act wholly wrongful
and unlawful. Generally, educational malpractice claims have been framed in
terms of misfeasance or nonfeasance, rather than malfeasance. See note 13 supra.
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Turning to the plaintiff's cause of action for misrepresentation,
the court found that any claim of negligent misrepresentation had
been disposed of by its prior analysis of the negligence cause of
action. 35 As for intentional misrepresentation, the court held that
plaintiffs pleading was procedurally insufficient under California
law, because it failed to allege any facts showing the requisite element of reliance upon the asserted misrepresentation. 3 6 Again,
however, considerations of public policy were central to the
court's analysis of the plaintiff's case.
An even more candid reliance upon public policy as a basis for
rejecting a cause of action for educational malpractice is to be
found in Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District.3 7 In an
opinion remarkable for its brevity, the New York Court of Appeals conceded the possibility that "within the strictures of a
traditional negligence or malpractice action, a complaint sounding
in 'educational malpractice' may be formally pleaded."3 8 But the
court continued that, even if such a cause could be legally framed,
it should be rejected on public policy grounds alone. The court
was persuaded that the lack of judicial expertise in matters of educational policy, coupled with the undue burden that would be
placed on the courts by recognizing a cause of action for educational malpractice, counseled against permitting such suits. 39 Nor

could the court overlook the availability of alternative administrative procedures that allowed public school students or their parents to enlist the aid of the State Commissioner of Education to
vindicate their educative rights.40
In Donohue the plaintiff had attended for four years the high
school operated by the defendant school district. Although the
plaintiff had received failing grades in several subjects, and was
unable to read, write, or comprehend simple English, he was allowed to graduate. Alleging that the district had breached its
As this appears to be the only reference to malfeasance in all of the educational
malpractice cases and commentary, it may have been nothing more than a slip of
the judicial pen.
35. Id. at 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
36. Id., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 863. See also 3 B. WrruKN CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE
§§ 573-74 (2d ed. 1971).

37. 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979), affig 64 App. Div. 2d
29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), affg 95 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S2d 584 (1977).
38. Id. at 442, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
39. Id., 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
40. Id. at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1355, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378.

duty to educate him by failing to test, evaluate, and teach him in
such a manner as to identify and remedy his ignorant condition,
the plaintiff claimed $5,000,000 in damages.
The trial court dismissed the Donohue suit for failure to state a
cause of action. 41 In a long and well-reasoned opinion, the intermediate appellate court, relying heavily upon Peter W., affirmed
the dismissal.42 The majority's principal point was the absence of
any legal duty to educate which the defendant school district
might be said to have breached. 43 In response to Donohue's suggestion that the state constitution itself imposed such a duty,44
the court noted that the provision of the constitution relied upon
by the plaintiff was clearly and specifically addressed to the state
legislature, mandating the creation and maintenance of a system
of public education. Such language, the court held, was never intended to create and impose a duty on local school districts to insure that each individual pupil receive a minimal level of
education. 45 Moreover, even if such a duty could be said to exist,
the court indicated that a suit for educational malpractice must
fail because "the failure of educational achievement cannot be
characterized as an 'injury' .... "4 6 And, even were a duty to be
found to exist and even were there to be an injury within the
meaning of tort law, establishing a causal connection between the
breach of the duty and the injury suffered would be so speculative, if not impossible, as to argue against the judiciary's entertaining suits for educational malpractice. 47
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals sustained, summarily dismissing plaintiff's assertion of a constitutionally created
duty to educate. 48 Indeed, far from supporting the plaintiff's case,
41. 95 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1977).

42. 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978).
43. Only three of the four sitting judges of the Appellate Division, Second De-

partment, joined in the opinion of the court. Dissenting, Mr. Justice Suozzi would
have recognized the cause of action, thus permitting the plaintiff to proceed to the
trier of fact. Id. at 44, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 884 (Suozzi, J., dissenting). Justice Suozzi,
thereby, became the first judge in America to go on record as favoring a cause of
action for educational malpractice. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Justice
Suozzi was careful to emphasize that he did not find any causational link to have
been established. He simply would have permitted the plaintiff the task of proving
such a causal relationship in order to recover.
44. The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be
educated.
N.Y. CONST. art. XI § 1.
45. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 40, 407
N.Y.S.2d 874, 880.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 42, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
48. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d
1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
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the court found that the state constitution created a presumption
against recognizing such causes of action. The purpose of the sections cited by the plaintiff was, held the court, "to make all matters pertaining to the general school system of the state within
the authority and control of the department of education and to
remove the same so far as practicable and possible from controversies in the courts." 49
The courts' extreme reluctance to recognize a cause of action
for educational malpractice, even in an arguably distinguishable
case, was illustrated by Hoffman v. Board of Education,SO handed
down by the New York Court of Appeals only six months after its
decision in Donohue. According to the court's own statement of
the facts in Hoffman, the plaintiff, Daniel Hoffman, had since
early childhood suffered from a serious speech defect of perhaps
psychosomatic origin owing to the death of his father during the
plaintiff's infancy. In September, 1956, Daniel was enrolled in kindergarten in the New York City school system. Shortly thereafter, he had been tested by a certified clinical psychologist.
Although plaintiff's speech defect made this testing difficult, the
examining psychologist placed the plaintiff's intelligence quotient
(I.Q.) at seventy-four (74). Seventy-five (75) had been established by the New York City Board of Education as the lower
limit demarcating children of normal intelligence from retarded
children. On this basis, Daniel was placed in a class for Children
of Retarded Mental Development (CRMD). The examining psychologist had been uncertain of his findings, however, and in his
report had specified that Daniel (1) should receive speech therapy and (2) should be "re-evaluated"5 ' within two years so that a
49. Id. at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378, quoting Bullock v. Cooley,

225 N.Y. 566, 576-77, 122 N.E. 630, 633 (1919).
50. 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979), rev'g 64 App. Div. 2d
369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978).

51. The exact meaning of the psychologist's recommendation of "re-evalua-

tion" was a source of disagreement not only between the plaintiff and the Board of

Education but also between the members of the Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-

sion. The Board took the position that, through daily observation, it had been continuously re-evaluating the plaintiff and, thus, had complied with the

psychologist's recommendation. The psychologist, who testified for the plaintiff,

stated that he had meant that the child should be retested within two years and
that this had been standard procedure in such cases. The appellate majority, on
the basis of the expert testimony offered by both sides, adopted the position urged
by the plaintiff, i.e. that intelligence is determined only by LQ. testing. Hoffman v.
Board of Educ., 64 App. Div. 2d at 377, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 107 (1978). Mr. Justice Martuscello, however, found the examining psychologist's testimony so "incredible"

more accurate estimation of his intellectual abilities could be
made. No such retesting was ever undertaken. Daniel was placed
in classes for mentally retarded children, where he remained until he was seventeen years old. At age seventeen he was transferred to an Occupational Training Center for the retarded,
where, at his mother's request, he was finally given a second intelligence test. His composite score was ninety-four (94). He was
then advised that he could no longer continue with his vocational
training because, being of normal intelligence, he was unqualified.
Hoffman then commenced an action against the New York
Board of Education, alleging that it had been negligent in its failure to retest his intelligence. This negligence had caused him to
be misclassified and improperly enrolled in the CRMD program
which, Hoffman alleged, had severely injured his emotional and
intellectual well-being and had reduced his ability to obtain employment. At trial, the jury awarded him damages in the amount
of $750,000.
A closely divided appellate court affirmed the trial judgment as
to liability, although it reversed the judgment as to damages and
would have required the plaintiff either to consent to a reduction
of the award to $500,000 or to retry the issue of damages. 5 2 The
thrust of the majority opinion was that the Board of Education's
failure to retest the plaintiff, in accordance with its own psychologist's recommendation, was an affirmative act of negligence and,
therefore, actionable.
Despite a variety of bases on which Hoffman might have been
distinguished from Donohue, the New York Court of Appeals reversed.53 At a very simple level the complexity and difficulty of
the issues presented in Hoffman was manifested by the fact that
the intermediate appellate court, the very same court that had
decided Donohue, divided three to two in affirming liability.54
that it should be discounted as a matter of law. In dissent, therefore, he adopted
the argument advanced by the Board, i.e. that the words "retest" and "re-evaluate" were words of art with different meanings and, thus, that the Board had complied with the psychologist's recommendation to "re-evaluate" the plaintiff within
two years. Id. at 381, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 111. Because it reversed for failure to state a
cause of action, the Court of Appeals did not address this issue. Hoffman v. Board
of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979).
52. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978).
53. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376
(1979).
54. While the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, did decide both Donohue and Hoffman, the two cases were not heard by the same panel
of judges. Only one member of the court that decided Donohue sat in Hoffman,
Mr. Justice Damiani, and his position in the latter case was consistent with that
which he had taken in the former. In Donohue, Mr. Justice Damiani had been the
spokesman for the court in denying plaintiff's cause of action. In Hoffman, he dis-

756
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This was, in turn reversed by a four to three decision of the Court
of Appeals. 55 A four-to-three reversal of a three-to-two decision
stands in marked contrast to the virtual unanimity of the courts
in true educational malpractice cases. This result strongly suggests that reasonable minds might find Hoffman distinguishable
from those cases.
In contrast to Peter W. and Donohue, the plaintiffs complaint in
Hoffman was not that the board had failed to take steps to detect
and correct his academic deficiencies but that it had committed
affirmative acts of negligence. 5 6 Also distinguishing Hoffman
from Donohue and Peter W. was the fact that in Hoffman the
school authorities had violated their own rules requiring retesting. In Donohue and Peter W. the plaintiffs' claims failed, at least
in part, because of an inability to identify any legal duty that the
school authorities had breached. On the one hand, neither judicial decision nor legislative provision could be found establishing
a duty to educate; on the other hand, it was necessary to permit a
certain discretion to the educators' professional judgment in determining what pedagogical strategies to adopt and when and
whether to advance a student. In Hoffman, however, it was not
within the Board's discretion to prevent its own psychologist's
recommendations from being carried out. Violation of clear, selfsented "because it is the public policy of this State that no cause of action exists
to recover for so-called educational malpractice." Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64
App. Div. 2d 369, 387, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 117 (1978). Indeed, Mr. Justice Damiani's
hands-off approach may represent the extreme position of judicial deference in
suits against the schools. Where educators are charged with negligence, Justice
Damiani would apparently deny recovery automatically. As a matter of law, the
difficulty with this approach is that it overlooks the negligent supervision cases.
See note 20 supra. The other dissenter in Hoffman, Mr. Justice Martruscello, did
not endorse Justice Damiani's theory but rather disagreed with the majority on
the facts. See note 51 supra.
55. Two members of the Court of Appeals, Justices Fuchsberg and Wachtler,
who voted to deny the cause of action in Donohue would have sustained Hoffman's right to recover. The third dissenter in Hoffman, Mr. Justice Meyer, did not
participate in Donohue. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 129, 400 N.E.2d
317, 321, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 380 (1979).
56. In analyzing educational malpractice claims, however, distinctions between misfeasance and nonfeasance may not be as helpful as they at first appear.
See note 13 supra. As dissenting Justice Damiani pointed out, the act of omitting
the retest could be seen as nonfeasance, whereas in Donohue the allegedly ineffective reading instruction could be characterized as misfeasance. Nevertheless, it
was on this ground that the majority of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
and the three dissenting members of the Court of Appeals would have distinguished Hoffrnan from Donohue. In point of fact, the complaints in both cases,
and in Peter W. as well, alleged acts both of omission and commission.

imposed guidelines presents a stronger case for the finding of
duty and breach than was present in either Donohue or Peter W.
Moreover, in Donohue and Peter W., any failure on the part of the
educational authorities to provide a positive program to remedy
the plaintiffs' ignorance left the plaintiffs no worse off than they
had been. Classifying Daniel as mentally retarded, however, imposed new and crippling burdens upon him. Thus, it could be argued, in Hoffman the duty, breach, causation, and injury were all
much clearer than in the earlier educational malpractice cases.5 7
It may even be incorrect to conceptualize Hoffman as an educational malpractice case. Arguably it is more closely analogous to
those cases imposing liability upon school authorities in the context of remedial or special education programs. 58 Furthermore, if
Hoffman is seen as an educational malpractice case, considerations of public policy do not argue as strongly against the imposition of liability. The precedential impact of recognizing liability
on the facts in Hoffman would have been quite restricted, assum59
ing the probable infrequency of such misclassification.
In spite of all such considerations, however, the New York
Court of Appeals dismissed Hoffman's suit for failure to state a
cause of action, simply reiterating its position in Donohue that a
cause of action for educational malpractice, "although quite possibly cognizable under traditional notions of tort law, should not, as
a matter of public policy, be entertained by the courts

....

"60

The majority explicitly conceded that, even were it to accept the
distinctions drawn by the lower courts it would not have decided
the case any differently.61
The adamant refusal of the judiciary to countenance a cause of
action for educational malpractice contrasts sharply with the enthusiasm of law review critics and commentators for recognizing
such an action. 62 On grounds both of law and policy, however, the
courts' deference appears to be well-taken.
57. See Diamond, EducationLaw, 29 SYRACUSE L REV. 103, 147-52 (1978).
58. See Note, EducationalMalpractice: Can the JudiciaryRemedy the Growing Problem of FunctionalIlliteracy?, 13 SUFFoLK U. L.REV. 27, 32 (1979); see also
note 20 supra.
59. Of course, automatic promotion could be conceptualized as a form of misclassification. But the injury resulting from positive misclassification, as opposed
to the negative misclassification in Hoffinan, is considerably more speculative.
See notes 190-98 infra and accompanying text.
60. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 126, 400 N.E.2d 317, 319, 424
N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (1979).
61. Id. at 126, 400 N.E.2d at 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
62. See notes 8 & 9 supra.
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III.

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF EDUCATIONAL

MALPRACTICE LIAmBI

Y

As the preceding discussion suggests, those who have sued for
educational malpractice have generally sought to hold educators
liable on a negligence theory, although misrepresentation has also
been pleaded. The lack of success that these claims have experienced has led others to attempt to construct a rationale for educational malpractice liability based either upon a contractual
relationship or a constitutional right. Closer analysis, however,
will reveal that each of these theories is unsatisfactory. Judicial
rejection of educational malpractice claims, therefore, has been
legally sound.
Contract
Of those theories advanced to support an educational malprac-

tice cause of action, perhaps the most easily dealt with is that
based on contract. The contractual relationship between student

and school has previously been recognized in suits against private
colleges and universities,

63

and some proponents of a cause of ac-

tion for educational malpractice have contended that, although
more plausible in the private school context, "[a] contract approach in a suit for failure to learn because of teacher negligence
or incompetence may have several advantages over a tort approach" even in the public school context.64 Among the perceived
advantages are: (1) the unavailability in contract of various defenses that might bar recovery in tort; (2) the fact that governmental immunity would be less likely to preclude recovery in
contract than in tort; (3) the generally longer statutes of limitations applicable to contract actions; 65 and (4) the wholly specula63. See note 20 supra;see also Note, supra note 15, at 401.
64. Comment, supra note 19, at 788. In point of fact, since tort liability has
been extended to virtually every type of contract misfeasance in the performance
of which may injure the promisee, the educational malpractice plaintiff would
have the option of suing in both tort and contract. See W. PROSSER, supra note 11,
at 617 nn. 47-56.
65. The period for bringing suit allowed by the statute of limitations might actually prove longer under a tort theory, however. Assuming that a cause of action
for educational malpractice were to be recognized, both Peter W. and Donohue
demonstrate that the plaintiff might not become aware of his injury until after
graduation from high school By analogy to the medical malpractice actions, the
appropriate rule would seem to be that the statute of limitations governing a tort
suit should not begin to run until the date of discovery of the injury. See, e.g.,
Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1974) (defective tubal ligation). The stat-

tive possibility that courts would be more receptive to allowing
recovery for loss of an expectancy than they have so far proven to

be in suits based upon negligence theories. 66

Among the more obvious defects of any contract-based theory
of recovery is the total absence of any bargained-for exchange.

Most jurisdictions require some negotiation for consideration. 6 7
But, at least in the case of elementary school students, attend-

ance cannot constitute consideration because it is compulsory. 68
The school, on the other hand, cannot refuse to accept the stu69
dent.
Alternatively, an educational malpractice plaintiff might plead

promissory estoppel, 70 arguing that, in reliance upon the public
school's implicit promise of non-negligent teaching, he or she sur-

rendered the opportunity of attending a private school. Such a
plaintiff, however, would then have the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he or she would and could
ute of limitations governing a contract action would begin to run from the moment
of breach.
66. From the point of view of those concerned with the impact upon public education of recognizing a cause of action for educational malpractice, contractbased claims would have an additional advantage: the damage awards would be
considerably smaller than in tort. Under a contract theory, for example, damages
should be limited to the amount of benefit denied by the teacher, e.g., payment for
remedial instruction. Under a tort theory, plaintiffs recovery could be much
broader, e.g., loss of future earnings. Needless to say, this is not an "advantage"
widely proclaimed by the proponents of an educational malpractice cause of action.
67. See E. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAw 338-84 (2d ed.
1977).
68. See K. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 254-317. Every state except Alabama
has a compulsory education statute. From time to time these statutes have been
challenged by religious groups on the ground that compulsory attendance violates
their First Amendment right to the free exercise of their religion. The courts have
consistently rejected these challenges and sustained the constitutionality of compulsory education. See, e.g., Rice v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 224, 49 S.E.2d 342
(1948); State v. Hershberger, 103 Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955). In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1974), an exception was created for the children of the
Amish, a tightly knit religious society of long history which permits its children to
attend public schools through the eighth grade but prefers to and does provide vocational training at home after that point. Nothing in the Yoder opinion, however,
can be read as calling into question the continued validity of the general principle
that state-compelled school attendance is constitutionally permissible. But cf.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state-compelled attendance atpublic schools held violative of due process). For further discussion of the compulsory education system, see Note, The Right to an Education: A Constitutional
Analysis, 44 U. CN. L. REv. 796, 799-803 (1975); Comment, The Rights of Children:
A Trust Mode A Child's Rights in the Compulsory Education System, 46 FoRD. L
REv. 669, 694-713 (1978). See also notes 157 & 158 infra and accompanying text.
69. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp.
279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modifying, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (school cannot
constitutionally exclude children, even though "uneducable").
70. See E. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL, supra note 67, at 384-424.
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have sought private education. The anomalous result would be to

make recovery in educational malpractice claims available only to
the children of relatively wealthy families (not generally
the kind
71

of plaintiffs most education reformers have in mind)
The tenuous nature of the contract theories is demonstrated by
the fact that recovery under such a theory must rest upon an implied term of an implied contract. To be sure, under the doctrine
of quasi-contract, courts have on occasion implied the existence
of a contractual obligation.7 2 Also courts have found certain
terms implied in some contracts, 7 3 but those decisions have all involved negotiated contracts, not contracts implied-in-law. In the
educational malpractice context, however, the court would first
have to imply a contract either between the teacher and the student or between the school district and the student. Then it would
have to find that an implied term of this implied contract was a
promise of adequate and effective instruction. The willingness of
judges to engage in such contractual bootstrapping is at least subject to doubt.
More fundamentally, the doctrine of quasi-contract was created
to prevent unjust enrichment.7 4 Its application to education
would require a considerable leap of the judicial imagination, for
neither the teacher nor the school district is unjustly enriched by
a student's graduation lacking basic academic skills.
A slightly different contract theory on which a public school
student suing for a failure to learn might rely is that of the third
party beneficiary. 75 The contract of which the student would argue that he or she was the third party beneficiary might be either
the contract between the teacher and the school district, an implied term of which was that the teacher would teach non-negligently, or an implied contract between the taxpayers and the
school district (or the state), whereby the district promised to educate the students committed to its care. In either case, the stu71. See Comment, supra note 19, at 785.
72. See E. MumHY & . SPEIDEL, supra note 67, at 428-30.
73. E.g., Lucas v. Haem, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962) (acceptance of employment to render legal services carries the implicit obligation to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as attorneys of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the
performance of the professional service they undertake). See also Arthur Murray,
Inc. v. Parns, 243 Ark. 441, 420 S.W.2d 518 (1967).
74. E. MurnHY & T. SPEIDEL, supra note 67, at 428-33.
75. Id. at 1335-1411.

dent as third party beneficiary of the contract would be entitled to
recover for its breach. But the student would first have to show
that the contracting parties had manifested an "intent to benefit"
third parties,76 a difficult, perhaps insurmountable burden.
Even if the student could establish that he or she was a third
party for whose benefit the contract was made, relying on the contract between the teacher and the school district would present
practical problems of recovery. Since the teacher's liability would
be for breach of contract and not for a tortious act, the Board of
Education probably would not be vicariously liable.7 7 But, if liability were to rest upon the teacher alone, the likelihood of any
substantial monetary recovery, given the pay scales of public
school teachers, seems remote indeed. Of course, the student
might be able to force the school district to dismiss the teacher, or
a court might order specific performance of the teacher's contractual promise to teach non-negligently. But these are hardly the
remedies that educational malpractice plaintiffs are seeking and
will, in fact, do such plaintiffs no good at all where the plaintiffs
have already graduated.7 8
Different but equally grave legal difficulties would attend any
attempt at third party enforcement of an implied contract between the school district (or the state) and the taxpayers. Most
jurisdictions take the position that, where a governmental agency
contracts to benefit the entire community, individuals do not have
a right to enforce that contract.7 9 It requires no feat of conceptual
prowess to conclude that, even were there an implied contract between the school district and its taxpayers, it is a contract intended to benefit the entire community and not one on which the
district intended to be liable to the third party beneficiaries of the
contract. 80 Therefore, under the accepted rule, an individual stu76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133, comment d at 288 (Tent.
Drafts Nos. 1-7 1973).
77. See id.; see also Proehl,Tort Liabilityfor Teachers, in T. ROADY &W. ANDERSEN, supra note 11, at 215-16.
78. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 19, at 758-60; Elson, supra note 9, at 642-47,
754-69.
79. See Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928) (a
member of the public may not maintain an action against a party that contracts
with the city to furnish water to the fire hydrants, in the absence of an apparent
intention on the part of the promisor to be liable to individual members of the
public as well as to the city for any loss resulting from a breach of the contract).
See also Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945); Riss v. City of
New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968). Moch was also
relied upon in Donohue to deny the existence of any duty on the part of the school
district under plaintiffs tort theory.
80. Of course, the question of whether a breaching promisor should be liable
to third party beneficiaries is essentially a matter of policy.
[T] he determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held
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dent could not maintain an action to enforce the contract.
A final and perhaps fatal defect with contract-based theories of
recovery for educational malpractice is that the law of contracts
has historically been less flexible than the law of torts and less receptive to novel causes of action. 81 Given the obstacles to bringing a contract-based action, educational malpractice plaintiffs
must turn to other avenues of recovery.
Misrepresentation
A more promising approach for establishing a cause of action
for educational malpractice would seem to be to argue that, by
inaccurately representing a student's competence and educational progress, the school district or its teachers should be liable
in damages for misrepresentation. 82 The lower court in Donohue
expressly declined to reach this issue,8 3 and the Peter W. court
dismissed plaintiff's intentional misrepresentation complaint as
improperly pleaded, having failed to aliege the requisite element
of reliance upon the asserted misrepresentation.84 This could be
construed to the
effect that a properly pleaded complaint would
85
have survived.
liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the
balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm
to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury,
and the policy of preventing future harm.
Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 588, 364 P.2d 685, 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 823 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). So, as with the determination of duty under a tort
theory, resolution of the legal issues in educational malpractice claims must turn
upon fundamental policy considerations. As will be suggested, those policy considerations are weighty against the recognition of a cause of action for educational
malpractice under whatever legal theory; see notes 228-319 infra and accompanying text.
81. See generally G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).

82. See Comment, supra note 19, at 782-84; Note, supra note 15, at 400-01; Comment, supra note 14, at 132-35. See generally SYRACUSE UNIV. RESEARCH
ING THE SCHOOLS FOR FRAuD (1973).

CORP.,

Su-

83. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist, 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 40, 407
N.Y.S.2d 874, 881. The Donohue court failed to reach the issue of misrepresentation because the plaintiff did not plead it; and the plaintiff did not raise the issue
for a very simple reason: He had received failing grades in several subjects and,
thus, had knowledge of at least some of his academic deficiencies.
84. See note 36 supra and accompanying text

85. See, e.g., Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 29, 44,
407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 885 (1978) (Suozzi, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 15, at 392;
Note, supra note 11, at 358 n.125. But see note 100 infra.

Liability for educational malpractice might be established
under either a negligent misrepresentation or an intentional misrepresentation theory. Once again, however, upon closer analysis
difficulties abound in establishing liability under either theory.
In order to establish a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, the educational malpractice plaintiff would have to
show that the defendant was under a duty to provide accurate
evaluations of a student's achievement, that the defendant had
breached this duty by failing to take reasonable care to ascertain
the truth as to the student's achievement and make that information available, and that this breach was causally related to some
injury suffered by the plaintiff.8 6 In states having statutes requiring school districts to keep parents and guardians informed of the
educational progress of their children, the necessary duty could
readily be found, since it cannot be assumed that the districts are
mandated to misinform.87 In those jurisdictions lacking such statutes, the duty can probably be implied from the student-teacherparent relationship. 88 But, as with attempts to base a cause of action on an ordinary negligence theory, the plaintiff would have
difficulty in establishing that he or she has suffered any injury
cognizable by tort law. 89 And, even if such injury could be established, proof of causation would be an enormous stumbling block,
for many factors extraneous to schooling are causes of any particular student's failure to learn.9 0 Moreover, all of the defenses
available in an ordinary negligence action, such as contributory
negligence, would be good against a claim predicated on negligent
misrepresentation. Finally, misrepresentations of opinion, as opposed to misrepresentations of fact, are generally not recognized
as a basis for recovery.9 1 Given the extreme imprecision of grading, student progress reports, even including the granting of diplo86. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 684-86, 704-07.
87. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10759 (West) (repealed 1975). Though repealed in 1975, § 10759 had been in force at the time of the acts complained of in
Peter W.
88. "[W]here the representation, although itself gratuitous, is made in the
course of the defendant's business or professional relations, the duty is usually
found." W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 706. The duty has also been found in a prospective contractual relationship; see Ultramares v. Touche Corp., 255 N.Y. 170, 174
N.E. 441 (1931). Thus, linking the contractual theory with the misrepresentation
theory could produce a finding of duty. The argument, however, would be as tenuous as it would be original.
89. See Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 823,
131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1976). Regarding the problem of establishing injury in an
educational malpractice action, see also notes 190-98 infra and accompanying text.
90. For a fuller discussion of causation in educational malpractice, see notes
199-227 inra and accompanying text.
91. W. PROSSER,supra note 11, at 721.
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mas, may be more accurately conceived of as expressions of
opinion rather than as statements of fact.
Under certain circumstances an educational malpractice cause
of action might lie for intentional misrepresentation. 92 But those
situations are likely to be extremely rare. Generally, therefore,
the hurdles awaiting an educational malpractice plaintiff attempting to plead successfully an intentional misrepresentation claim
will be even more difficult to surmount than those confronting a
negligent misrepresentation complaint. In the first place, the
plaintiff would have to prove an intent to deceive. 93 This might be
the case where a teacher misrepresented a student's lack of ability to parents in order to preclude them from speaking to the
school administrators. But a good faith error on the teacher's part
in assessing the student's progress, while it might not avoid liability for negligent misrepresentation, would be sufficient to disprove any fraudulent intention.
Additionally, even where an intent to deceive is shown, educational malpractice plaintiffs will have to show (1) that they relied
upon the educator's misrepresentations, (2) that they had a right
to so rely, and (3) that the reliance was reasonable. 94 With respect to their reliance, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that, but
for the misrepresentations, they would have changed their course
of action. 95 Generally speaking, this would be done by showing
that, had it not been for the misleading reports, the parents would
have switched the student to a private school or provided private
tutoring. But, as previously noted, allowing recovery on such a
theory would permit relief only to those plaintiffs who need it
least.9 6 Moreover, as educational malpractice defendants are al-

most certain to point out, parents and guardians have or should
have an opportunity to judge for themselves whether their child
lacks even rudimentary reading and writing abilities, nor does
such judgment require any particular expertise.97 Therefore,
even where there has been deceitful intent and a factual misrep92. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 19, at 782 (postulating various hypothetical
fact situations which could give rise to an intentional misrepresentation action for
educational malpractice).
93. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 706.
94. Id. at 714-15.
95. Id.
96. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
97. Note the implication of this argument for the creation of a "professional"
standard of care in any educational malpractice action based upon a negligence

resentation, it is likely to be found to be immaterial. 98
For these reasons, even those critical of the courts' present posture in this area concede that misrepresentation theory "is probably not significant in educational malpractice cases." 99 Besides, it
is possible that the courts might refuse recognition to even a wellpleaded misrepresentation complaint for the same reasons of
public policy on which they have relied in dismissing suits based
on ordinary negligence theories.100 After all, recognizing educational malpractice causes of action predicated on misrepresentation will not address the central concern of would-be educational
reformers. Permitting recovery for misrepresentation, either negligent or intentional, will not render the public school system any
better able to educate its students. At best, such awards would
simply encourage the system to be more honest about its inability.1O'

ConstitutionalRight
As de Tocqueville observed, no major issue arises in American
politics that does not eventually resolve itself into a constitutional
controversy.10 2 It is not surprising, therefore, to find the advocates of a cause of action for educational malpractice turning to
the Constitution, when defects are found in other of their theories.103 This is particularly inviting because, if the violation of a
theory. For a discussion of the "standard of care" problems, see notes 167-89 infra
and accompanying text.
98. See W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 720-21.
99. Comment, supra note 14, at 132. In a suit against a private school, however, a claim of either negligent or intentional misrepresentation would be much
more viable. Such a claim might be employed by parents in a suit to rescind their
contract with the school or as a defense in a suit by the school for the non-payment of tuition.
100. In fact, the Peter W. court did refuse to entertain the plaintiff's suit for negligent misrepresentation by relying upon the same policy arguments it had employed to dismiss the negligence cause of action. See note 35 supra and
accompanying text. In view of this, the court's refusal to address the intentional
misrepresentation claim, because improperly pleaded, may not stand for the proposition that a properly pleaded action could withstand a motion to dismiss, as
some have so confidently predicted. See note 85 supra. It may stand for that proposition, but it need not necessarily do so. Rather, if pressed, a court might reject a
properly pleaded intentional misrepresentation suit on policy grounds.
101. See Comment, supra note 14, at 143-44 Note, supra note 15, at 400-01. Both
the legal system and the school system should, of course, favor the promotion of
honesty. But, when this benefit is balanced against the potential costs attendant
upon the recognition of a cause of action for educational malpractice, see notes
268-92 infra and accompanying text, this may well be an instance in which honesty
is not the best policy.
102. 1 A. DE TOcQUEVmLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 283-86 (P. Bradley trans.

1945).
103. E.g., Note, supra note 11, at 348; Comment, supra note 14, at 121-23; Note,
supra note 15, at 401-03.
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constitutional right could be found, it would render the educational authorities liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.104 But, first, some
constitutional right would have to be found. This task is rendered

considerably more difficult by the fact that no less an authority
than the United States Supreme Court has held that there is no
05
federal constitutional right to an education.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the
Supreme Court did indicate that, insofar as a state chose to pro-

vide public education, it must provide a minimally adequate education.

06

But reliance upon this dictum to establish liability

under the Civil Rights Act would be misplaced. Rodriguez was a
class action seeking to enforce the equal protection clause.

07

The

minimum standard described in Rodriguez, thus, may not necessarily be available to enforcement by an individual student.

08

Moreover, Rodriguez itself stands for the proposition that the
quality of instruction need not be absolutely equal. Finally, an examination of the facts in Rodriguez suggests that the acceptable
level of education the Court had in mind was minimal indeed.

For all these reasons, proponents of a cause of action for educational malpractice have not put much faith in equal protection ar104. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), a codification of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, states:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress....
The scope of liability of public entities and public officials under section 1983 has
been greatly expanded in recent years. See, e.g., Monnell v. New York City Dept.
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622
(1980), Maine v. Thiboutot, - U.S.--, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980). This expansion of liability has been extended to school officials. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975).
105. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). Several
state courts, however, have found that a right to education is established, explicitly or implicitly, by their state constitutions. E.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473,
303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); In re Downey, 72 Misc. 2d 772, 340
N.Y.S.2d 687 (Farn. Ct. 1973); Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973);
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied,
432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A-2d 359 (1977). The existence of such state-established rights, however, do not effect liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
106. 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
108. Comment, supra note 14, at 123.

guments.10 9

Alternatively, the due process clause may hold greater promise.
In the so-called "right to treatment" cases, involving persons involuntarily committed to state institutions in civil proceedings,
the courts have held that, since the denial of liberty is for the express purpose of habilitation, the failure to provide treatment constitutes a violation of due process. 110 Arguing by analogy, the
advocates of a cause of action for educational malpractice contend
that the enforced confinement of public school students amounts
to a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, unless appropriate, non-negligent instruction is provided." This position
is strengthened by the fact that the concept of due process has
been held to govern certain aspects of the student-school relationship."12

The courts have not proven receptive to the involuntary confinement theory, however. For example, in In re Gregory B., an
action for habitual truancy, the student-respondents defended by
arguing that their non-attendance was justified because the
school involved wasn't teaching them anything.1 3 To support
their allegation, they sought to compel the disclosure of various
school documents. In denying the discovery motion on the ground
that the information sought was immaterial and unnecessary, the
court briefly discussed the respondents' due process theory.1 4 It
postulated a set of hypothetical situations in which the inadequacy of the educational program might be tantamount to confinement in violation of due process. But, it continued, "we are
109. See, e.g., Note, supra note 15, at 402 n.115. The situation would be different,
were some students permitted to participate in remedial programs, while others
were denied such opportunity.
110. E.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affid sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See generally Ennis, The
Rights of Mental Patients, in THE RiGHrs OF AERICwANs 484 (N. Dorsen ed. 1970).
111. See Note, supra note 68, at 807-09; Comment, supra note 14, at 121-22; Note,
supra note 11, at 356-57.
112. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (student's entitlement to public education is a property interest such that suspension from public school requires proceeding consistent with due process); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (suspension of public school students for wearing
black armbands to protest Vietnam War violative of free speech and due process
guarantees). But cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (due process does not
require schools to provide notice and hearing prior to application of physical discipline); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (since the state can substantively
limit the extent of an entitlement, it can also adopt procedural limitations). See
generally Alexander & Horton, Ingrahamv. Wrighf" A Primerfor Cruel and Unusual Jurisprudence,52 So. CAL. L. REV. 1305 (1979).
113. 88 Misc. 2d 313, 387 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Fain. Ct. 1976).
114. Since the court expressly stated that it "need not reach this argument," id.
at 316, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 383, however, its discussion can only be considered as dicta.
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not here dealing with theoretical constructions. Nor do such hypothetical examples . . . apply to the instant matter."" 5 Rather,
the court indicated, it must judge the matter within the context of
the actual operation of the New York City schools, and in that
context it found the analogy to the "right to treatment" cases to
6
be "improbable.""
Any attempt to sustain an educational malpractice claim on a
due process theory drawn from the "right to treatment" cases encounters several analytic difficulties. First, in order to establish a
right to be unconfined, the educational malpractice plaintiff would
have to show that compulsory school attendance constitutes confinement." 7 But the nature of the confinement, in any, is different from that involved in the "right to treatment" cases. Unlike
mental patients, students are confined to the institution for only a
fraction of the school day, an even smaller fraction of the week,
and a far smaller fraction of the calendar year." 8 Moreover, in
the "right to treatment" cases, the evidence established that the
plaintiffs were receiving no treatment whatsoever." 9 Even in the
most inadequate school districts, however, students receive some
education. To effectively analogize compulsory school attendance
to the "right to treatment" cases, the educational malpractice
115. Id. at 317, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
116. Id. at 316, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
117. See Comment, supra note 68, at 703-04. The argument, moreover, would
apply only to students below the age of compulsory attendance. Students above
that age, generally secondary school students, could not argue that their "confinement" was involuntary. They have the option not to attend. See also note 125 infra.
118. Granting the ironic humor of an analogy between the public schools and
mental institutions, it may be that a more appropriate analogy would be one between the schools and the prisons. In neither case, however, are the schools the
kind of total institutions that are prisons and mental hospitals. This may account
in part for the schools' relative lack of success in modifying the behavior of their
inmates. See generally E. GOFFmAN, AsyLUms 1-125 (1961) (on the characteristics
of total institutions).
A total institution may be defined as a place of residence and work where
a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society
for
an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered
round of life.
Id. at xiii.
Interestingly enough, however, Goffman's emphasis, unlike that in the "right to
treatment" cases, is not upon the involuntary nature of the inmate role. By
Goffman's definition, thus, boarding schools might be seen as total institutions.
But day schools, public or private, could surely not be, given the availability to
students of concurrent alternative realities.
119. See note 110 supra.

plaintiff would have to show that the school was offering nothing
but a custodial service.
Even could such a demonstration be made, that would not necessarily establish the analogy. The purpose of confinement of
public school students differs from that of mental patients. "Because the only constitutional justification for civilly committing a
mental retardate . . . is habilitation, it follows ineluctably that
once committed such a person is possessed of an inviolable constitutional right to habilitation."120 But the justifications for compulsory school attendance are neither as unidimensional nor
necessarily as altruistic.121 The state has the authority to expose
the child to education not only for the good of the child but also
for the good of the state.122 It may also be that simple custody is
a justification for the compulsory attendance laws. It is of note
that most of these statutes on their face do not require education,
23
only attendance.1
Yet another problem with analogizing the treatment cases to
education lies in the formulation of standards to judge the quality
of the education provided. This has presented the courts with no
difficulty in the "right to treatment" cases because, in the field of
mental health, "custodial care" and "treatment" are terms of art
with distinct and well-understood meanings. No such clarity exists in the education field as to the definition of a minimal educational standard.124 Furthermore, in mental health, fulfilling the
patient's right to treatment is accomplished by following particular procedures. It is not measured by the patient's progress in relation to an externally defined goal or achievement level. This in
itself may render the whole body of "right to treatment" precedent inapposite to educational malpractice litigation.
Even more fundamentally, the due process theory, as with misrepresentation arguments, is not directed toward the kind of reform which is the essential concern of those who advocate
educational malpractice as a cause of action. The reasoning of the
"right to treatment" cases may call into question the constitutionality of compulsory education laws. 1 25 But these cases are not
120. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
121. In the confusion and debate over the institution's purpose, the schools
may, indeed, be more closely analogous to prisons than to mental hospitals; see
note 118 supra. See generally S. GRUPP, THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (1971).
122. See note 68 supra and notes 151 & 158 infra and accompanying text.
123. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 76 (Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20, § 911
(1964).
124. For further discussion of the difficulties involved in defining educational
standards, see notes 171-79 infra and accompanying text.
125. Were a suit for educational malpractice premised on an involuntary con-
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precedent for those who would hold the schools accountable for
children's failure to learn or force the schools to provide an "adequate" or "better" education. It may well be that compulsory education should be abandoned. But that is an entirely different
argument than the one which those who would recognize an educational malpractice cause of action are seeking to make.
Negligence
Because constitutional theory, like contract and misrepresentation, has proven inadequate to support the desired cause of action, educational reformers have tended to place their emphasis
where they began, with common law negligence. But here, too,
creating liability for educational malpractice would require an unjustified extension or distortion of present doctrine. As Peter W.,
Donohue, and Hoffman eloquently testify, the principal difficulty
has lain in finding any legally cognizable duty of care owed by educators to their students. But, even were such a duty to be discovered, educational malpractice advocates would yet experience
numerous and substantial difficulties in (1) defining the appropriate standard of care to differentiate educational malpractice from
appropriate practice, (2) establishing causation, and (3) proving
the existence of any compensable injury.
Duty. There can be no recovery for negligence unless there is a
26
legal basis for imposing a duty of due care upon the defendant.1
A plaintiff seeking recognition of an educational malpractice
claim, therefore, would first have to convince a court that the educator had a duty to provide competent instruction. The difficulties
which the educational malpractice plaintiff faces in this regard
are well illustrated by Peter W. The plaintiff in Peter W. argued
that his enrollment in the schools established a duty of care in
the school district under one or more of the following theories:
(1) that, by assuming the function of instruction, the school district had assumed a concomitant duty to exercise reasonable care
in discharging that function; (2) that the nature of the relationfinement-due process theory to succeed, depending upon the exact reasoning of
the court, a state seeking to limit the liability of itself, its school districts, and its
teachers might (1) decrease the number of hours in the school day, (2) lower the
compulsory attendance age, or (3) repeal the compulsory attendance laws.

126. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.RCo., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (Cardozo,

c.J.).

ship between teachers and students created a duty to exercise
reasonable care; and (3) that a duty to exercise reasonable care in
carrying out the function of academic instruction was statutorily
recognized in California. The precedent relied upon by the plaintiff in each of these arguments was dismissed almost summarily
12 7
as inapplicable.
Two possible origins of a duty to use reasonable care in instruction have been advanced: common law principles and statutory
enactments. 28 The first theory suffers from the fact that there exists no direct precedent for a common law duty. Nevertheless, arguments by analogy abound.
The first of these, the theory of an undertaking, draws support
from the common law of rescue.129 Both Prosser and the Restatement (Second) of Torts assert that when one undertakes to
render a service to another upon which that other relies, the actor
assumes a duty to act non-negligently and will be liable for any
harm that results from negligent performance. 13 0 Just as there is
no duty requiring a school system to educate, there is no duty at
common law to rescue another in peril. An attempted rescue,
however, may create liability. "Where performance clearly has
been begun, there is no doubt that there is a duty of care."131 The
rescuer need not succeed, but he must act reasonably under the
circumstances. Similarly, it is argued, the school system and its
teachers incur a duty to educate.132 The uneducated child is like
a potential victim in need of rescue. When the schools undertake
the attempt to educate this child, though they need not succeed,
they do assume a duty to make the attempt non-negligently. If
educational alternatives are available and the school negligently
fails to utilize them, it has not acted reasonably under the circumstances and should be liable in tort. This argument is further buttressed by the fact that the general principle of voluntary
assumption of duty has been applied specifically to government
127. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 820, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861, distinguishing Lau v.
Nicholas, 414 U.S. 563 (1973); Serrano v. Priest, 5 CaL 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487
P.2d 1241 (1971); Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 376, 470 P.2d 360 (1970).
128. For a discussion of the "duty" concept by those favoring a cause of action
for educational malpractice, see Comment, supra note 8, at 564-72; Note, supra
note 58, at 33-41; Note, supra note 15, at 393-96; Comment, supra note 14, at 118-30;
Elson, supra note 9, at 693-97; Comment, supra note 19, at 767-81.
129. See Note, supra note 15, at 398 n.92. See generally J. RATCLiF, THE GOOD
SALArrAN AND THE LAw (1966).
130. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 343-48; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS

§ 323 & comment e at 139 (1965).
131. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 346.
132. See Note, supra note 15, at 398 n.92.
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133
undertakings in several cases.

The undertaking theory, however, normally requires the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's affirmative actions,13 4 and the dif-

ficulties of establishing reliance in educational malpractice
actions have already been noted. 3 5 Moreover, unlike the under-

takings in the cases applying the voluntary assumption of duty
theory to government actions, a school district's provision of education is not discretionary or voluntary, but mandatory. Perhaps
the state, as creator of the educational system, might be liable
under this theory. But the cases will not support liability for
school districts or for individual teachers. Finally, the educational

malpractice plaintiff seeking to establish duty on an undertaking
theory must confront the fact that the courts have been reluctant
to apply the undertaking theory where the undertaking in ques36
tion was the provision of some broad social service.1

A second line of argument to establish a common law duty to

educate proceeds from the school's duty of care for the physical
safety of its students while at school.137 So far, this is the only

clearly recognized tort duty which a school system has towards
its students. There is, however, a strong countervailing reason for

not extending the educator's duty by this analogy. When a school
district or its teachers are charged with a duty to act non-negli-

gently in supervising the physical safety of the students, they are
held to the traditional reasonable person standard.138 The educa-

tional malpractice plaintiff, however, is seeking to hold educators
to a higher standard of care, a professional or "reasonable

teacher" standard. 3 9 Even the advocates of an educational mal133. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (discretionary operation of lighthouse); Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr.
508 (1964) (gratuitous promise by sheriff to warn plaintiff of release of dangerous
prisoner); Conelly v. State, 3 Cal. App. 3d 744, 84 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1970) (negligent
preparation and release of weather and flood information).
134. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 347.

135. See notes 94-98 supra and accompanying text.
136. Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928) (Cardozo,
C.J.) (suit for negligent failure to provide adequate water to extinguish a fire
before it destroyed plaintiff's warehouse not maintainable as an action for a common law tort). Moch is not followed in at least one jurisdiction; see Doyle v. South
Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199, 199 A.2d 875 (1964). See also note 79 supra.
137. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 566-67. For further discussion of the
cases involving physical injury to students and their reception in educational malpractice actions, see note 20 supra.
138. See note 20 supra; see generally W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 149-66.
139. The appropriate standard of care, therefore, is one factor to consider in de-

practice cause of action, therefore, concede that the "basic distinction between standards of care applicable to physical
supervision and academic instruction significantly weakens any
attempt to analogize the two" and leaves this line of argument
"without a solid logical basis."14o
The third theory for the creation of a common law duty of nonnegligent academic instruction rests on an analogy to the professional malpractice actions.141 This, assert the commentators, is
"ft]he strongest legal argument for recognition of an educator's
duty to provide competent academic instruction ... ."142 Even
so, it is not all that strong, for it rests upon the unarticulated
premise that public school educators are, in fact, professionals.
To be sure, that is how public school teachers characterize themselves. 14 3 But self-characterization by an occupational group
should not be legally dispositive. Could physicians escape professional liability if the American Medical Association were to unilaterally reclassify medicine as a trade?
Upon analysis it appears that there is reason to doubt the professionalism of public school educators, at least in any legally
meaningful sense. Sociological studies of the "professions" normally exclude education because it fails to meet various criteria
of professionalism.'" By occupation, the professional holds himself or herself out as possessing certain skills and special knowledge secured by arduous post-graduate education; as a
consequence, persons who utilize those services have a right to
expect the professional to use that skill and knowledge with some
minimum degree of competence.145 The public school teacher, by
contrast, possesses no well-defined technical knowledge comparable to that of a legal or medical professional. To the extent that
educators hold themselves out as possessing any special skills or
knowledge, it is knowledge in a particular substantive area (e.g.,
termining whether a duty exists; judicial consideration of these two elements,
thus, does not actually proceed in two separate and distinct phases. Regarding the
standard of care, see notes 167-89 infra and accompanying text.
140. Comment, supra note 8, at 567.

141. See W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 161-65. Technically, it is accurate to
speak of "malpractice" only where the object of the negligence action is to hold
the professional defendant liable as a professional. It follows that the professional
standard of care is applicable only once a professional duty has been established.
142. Comment, supra note 8, at 567.
143. See, e.g., Saretsky, The Strangely Significant Case of Peter Doe, 54 Pm
DELTA KAPPAN 589, 592 (1973).
144. See, e.g., D. LORTIE, ScHooL TEACHER: A SocIOLOGIcAL STUDY (1975); W.
MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES 5-6 (1970); Goode, The Theoretical

Limits of Professionalization,in THE SEm-PRoFssioNS AND THEIm ORGANMZATIONS
266, 277-78 (A. Etzioni ed. 1969); Wilensky, The Professionalizationof Everyone?, 70
Ari. J. Soc. 137 (1964).
145. See T. ROADY &W. ANDERSEN, supra note 11.
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biology, history) and not with respect to the process of education
per se. 14 The professional relies primarily upon status and reputation to determine earning capacity. The public school teacher
receives an annual wage according to a salary schedule determined by an external authority. Indeed, society does not accord
high social status to teachers precisely because it perceives that
the knowledge possessed by educators is readily comprehensible

by laypersons, unlike medical or legal knowledge.14 7 In short,
48
public school teachers are at best aspiring semi-professionals.1

Therefore, the application of the professional negligence cases to
this occupational group, in order to create a duty of care to educate, would be inappropriate.
Unfortunately for the advocates of an educational malpractice
cause of action, arguments that statutory or constitutional provi146. This tendency is, of course, more pronounced as one moves up the educational hierachy. Perhaps a political science professor might be held liable for
political science malpractice, assuming that an appropriate standard of care could
be developed. But to hold the same professor liable for educational malpractice is
a different matter. On the other hand, the advocates of a cause of action for educational malpractice are not seeking to hold the second grade teacher liable for arithmetic malpractice.
147. See Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824,
131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860-61 (general public believes that laypeople can teach or at
least offer valuable advice to educators on appropriate teaching methods). Even
though there is widespread agreement about the utility of education, it is this public perception of the level of knowledge necessary to teach effectively that negatively affects the status of educators. W. MOORE, supra note 144, at 235. See also
note 172 infra and accompanying text.
148. Marcus, School Teachers and Militant Conservatism, in THE PROFESSIONS
AND THEm PROSPEcTs 191 (R. Friedson ed. 1971); W. MOORE, supra note 144, at 73.
Candor compels the admission that the courts have not entirely subscribed to
this line of reasoning. See, e.g., McGrath v. Burkhard, 131 Cal. App. 2d 367, 376, 280
P.2d 864, 870 (1955) (imposition of extracurricular duties permissible because of
professional nature of teacher's- position); District 300 Educ. Ass'n v. Board of
Educ., 31 Ill. App. 3d 550, 554, 334 N.E.2d 165, 168 (1975) (teacher's professional status not demeaned by assignment of extracurricular duties); McCullough v. Cashmere School Dist., 15 Wash. App. 730, 734, 551 P.2d 1046, 1050 (1976) (contract offer
must reflect educator's education, experience, and professional preparation). In
according teachers professional status, the McGrath court was also influenced by
the fact that they received an annual wage, rather than an hourly rate like a laborer. It should be noted, however, that many of these factors will support a contrary conclusion. Doctors, lawyers, and psychiatrists, for example, customarily bill
by the hour; and, while it may be argued whether the performance of extracurricular duties, e.g., monitoring the students' lunch hour, is demeaning, it is difficult to
conceive of true professionals performing them. A physician monitoring hospital
patients' meals? Cf. Hoose v. Drumm, 281 N.Y. 54, 57-58, 22 N.E.2d 233, 234 (1939)
(teacher required to meet the standard of care to be expected of an ordinary, prudent parent under the circumstances).

sions dealing with education create a duty of care in academic instruction have fared even less favorably at the hands of the courts
than have efforts to create a common law duty. Thus, in Donohue,
the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged the possibility of a
common law duty but abruptly rejected the idea that there existed any statutory duty to educate. 49 Similarly, in Peter W., the
plaintiff invoked various provisions of both the Education and
Government Codes, 5 0 but the California court held that these
statutes were merely "directed to the attainment of optimum educational results, . .. not as safeguards against 'injury'. .. ,,151
The principal difficulty with creating a statutory duty of due
care in academic instruction lies in the breadth and generality of
the legislative mandates involved. 152 Generally, a statutory duty
exists only where the underlying purpose of the statute is the
protection of individuals from injury of a particular type. 5 3 The
statute usually prohibits or commands particular actions in specific situations and will be applicable only if the plaintiff is a
member of the class of persons intended to be protected by the
statute and if the injury suffered is of a type covered by the statute.154 State statutory and constitutional provisions relating to
149. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979). The trial and appellate courts in
Donohue had dismissed the plaintiffs statutory claim with equal dispatch. 95
Misc. 2d 1, 2, 408 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585 (1977); 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 37-38, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874,
880 (1978).
150. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10759 (West) (repealed 1975) (requiring school district
to keep parents informed as to the educational progress of the child); CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 12154 (reorganized as § 12101) (West 1977) (mandating compulsory fulltime education); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8573.(reorganized as § 51255) (West 1978) (forbidding school district from granting a diploma unless certain standards of proficiency are met); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8505 (reorganized as § 51204) (West 1978)
(requiring that school districts design courses to meet the needs of its pupils).
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1980) provides:
Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately
caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.
See generally E. KuNzi, Tie CA ORNmiA EDUCATION CODE (1978).
151. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 825, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 862.
152. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189:10 (1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-1.1(4)
(1977); MASS. AiM. LAws ch. 76, § 1 (Supp. 1975). Were a statutory duty of due
care in academic instruction to be recognized, the content of that duty would, of
course, vary from one state to another, depending upon the wording and history of
the state's education laws. See Note, supra note 11, at 344; Comment, supra note
14, at 127-30.
153. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, 190-97.
154. Id. But see Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485
(1953) (allowing individual recovery for breach of a statute intended to benefit the
public at large); Foley v. New York, 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E.2d 69 (1945) (interpreting
public nuisance statute as intended to confer individual protection).
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education are, thus, not of a type normally thought to create a tort
duty. They merely require the creation and maintenance of public
school systems. They are not intended to protect individual children against the injury of non-education but instead are designed
to promote the general welfare through the development of a literate and productive population.155
This conclusion is further strengthened by the historical background of the education laws. 1 56 The free public school movement was a product of the industrial revolution, a social and
economic phenomenon that, among other things, created a demand for an educational system that would train people to adequately perform complex tasks. This need was eventually filled
by state and local government through the provision of a compulsory, tax-supported, public school system. From its earliest beginnings, therefore, the purpose of the free public school movement
was to confer the benefit of education upon the general populace.
In fact, far from creating a right to education for the benefit of
the individual student, the compulsory attendance laws-rightly
understood-actually appear to argue against the existence of
such a right. The justification for the compulsory education laws
lies in the recognition of the parent's duty to educate the child,
57
not for the benefit of the child, but for the benefit of the state,1
and at least one state supreme court has squarely so held.158
Since a right would seem to belong to the party with the power to
enforce it, it must follow that the right to education belongs to the
59
state as representative of the general public.1
Alternatively, a duty of educating a student to a certain required minimum level of proficiency might be found in statutes or
155. Contra Comment, supra note 19, at 780 (education statutes are designed to
benefit a particular class, school-age children, rather than the general public).
156. See J. HOGAN, THE SCHOOLS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 1
(1974); Koenig, The Law and Educationin HistoricalPerspective, in THE COURTS
A
EDUCATION 1, 10 (C. Hooker ed. 1978).

157. "One of the most important natural duties of the parent is the obligation to
educate his child, and this duty he owes not to the child only, but to the commonwealth." State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 329, 61 N.E. 730, 732 (1901).
158. Fogg v. Board of Educ., 76 N.H. 296, 299, 82 A. 173, 174-75 (1912) ("the promotion of the general intelligence of ... the body politic" held to be the primary

purpose for maintaining the public school system). See also notes 68 & 117-23
supra and accompanying text.
159. But cf. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874 (D.D.C. 1972) ('requir-

ing parents to see that their children attend school under pain of criminal penalties presupposes that an educational opportunity will be made available to the
children").

regulations mandating specific actions in defined situations involving students with identifiable learning problems. 160 Such
statutes or regulations do focus upon individual student needs
and do address specific educational problems. But to hold educators liable for procedural violations does not necessitate liability
for negligent academic instruction; nor are such statutes necessarily intended to permit private causes of action. To date, thereuse of such
fore, the courts have not been receptive to the
161
statutes or regulations to create a new tort duty.
Ultimately, as the court recognized in Peter W.,162 whether or
not the law will find that a particular duty of care is owed by one
to another is a matter of policy. 163 There is no universal, certain
test for establishing duty. The courts can find it where they
choose to do so, and can as easily refuse to find it.164 The plaintiffs interest in legal protection must be balanced against competing policy claims.165
Judicial recognition of the existence of a duty of care is dependent upon
principles of sound public policy and involves the consideration of numerous relevant factors which include, inter alia:... the degree to which the
courts should be involved in the regulation of [the relationship between
the parties] and the social utility of the activity out of which the alleged
injury arises; ...the degree of certainty that the alleged injuries were
160. See Comment, supra note 8, at 569-71, 596.
161. See Doe v. Board of Educ., No. 48277 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County Md.
July 6, 1979), reported in Comment, supra note 8, at nn.1, 3, & 60-63 and accompanying text. See also Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424
N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979), rev'g, 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978).
In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), the United States Supreme Court did implicitly recognize a state commitment to provide a meaningful education, holding
that non-English-speaking students who were denied compensatory language instruction had been foreclosed from a meaningful education in violation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. See also Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279
(D. N.M. 1972). But the recognition of a duty to provide education was implicit
only; and, as even the proponents of educational malpractice concede, Lau is "distinguishable from the educational malpractice suit." Comment, supra note 14, at
126. It involved a class action brought by a minority group suing under clear statutory language and not the creation of a new cause of action on judicial authority
alone.
162. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
163. As Prosser states:
The statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential questionwhether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the
defendant's conduct ....

It is a shorthand statement of a conclusion,

rather than an aid to analysis in itself .... [I]t should be recognized that
"duty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expresion of the sum total of
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular
plaintiff is entitled to protection.
W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 325-26 (footnotes omitted).
164. See, e.g., Prosser, PasgrafRevisited, 52 MIcH. L, REv. 1 (1953); Seavey, Mr.
Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARv.L.REv. 372 (1939).
165. Discussion of whether those competing policy considerations augur
against recognition of a cause of action for educational malpractice is reserved, see
notes 228-319 infra and accompanying text.
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proximately caused by the defendant... ; economic considerations, which
include the ability of the defendant to respond in damages; and administrative considerations, which concern the ability of the courts to cope with
a flood of new litigation, the probability of feigned
claims and the difficul166
ties inherent in proving the plaintiff's case.

Standardof care. Also relevant is the degree to which reasonable people can agree as to the proper course to be followed to
prevent injury. Yet this, too, presents a problem in framing a
cause of action for educational malpractice on a negligence theory, the inability to define an appropriate standard of care.
Were a legal duty of care to be recognized in educational malpractice cases, the courts would then have to establish a standard
by which to determine whether that duty had been breached. Depending upon the origin of the duty,167 the choice would be between imposing a reasonable person or a professional standard of
68

care.1

In educational malpractice actions, however, a reasonable person standard of care would be unsatisfactory. True, this is the
standard to which teachers have been held in the negligent supervision cases. 169 But supervising the physical activities of children
is a responsibility frequently experienced by members of the general public and easily understood by jurors. Allegations of incompetent pedagogy, by contrast, would probably involve expert
testimony proffered by both sides. In such cases, use of a reasonable person standard of care would involve the danger of arbitrary jury verdicts. Such considerations have influenced even
those favorably disposed to an educational malpractice cause of
action to argue that "adaptation of a reasonable person standard
to the area of academic instruction is questionable."170
A professional standard of care would be more protective of the
166. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 35, 407
N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (1978) (court's emphasis), afOd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418
N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
167. Regarding the interrelationship between the concept of duty and the standard of care, see note 139 supra and accompanying text. Recognition of a statutory
duty would imply its own unique standard of care defined by the requirements of
the statute on which the duty was predicated. Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566
(1974) (state imposed standard of proficiency in English for high school graduation requires compensatory language instruction for non-English-speaking pupils).
168. Discussions of the appropriate standard of care by those in favor of an educational malpractice cause of action may be found in Comment, supra note 8, at
572-79; Comment, supra note 14, at 126-27.
169. See note 10 supra.
170. Comment, supra note 8, at 573.

educator.' 7 ' But, in view of the abstract quality of education and

the existence of numerous and conflicting theories of learning,
formulation of a judicially manageable standard of professional

care is unlikely if not impossible.172 In medical malpractice cases,
the standard of care required is that of the level of skill and

knowledge common to members of the profession in good standing, and practical in the community.? 3 In education, creation of a
workable standard of ordinary care and skill is confounded by the
lack of established goals in the field and the widespread disagree-

ment among educators as to the appropriate response to any particular, practical pedagogic problem.174 Indeed, educators cannot

even agree as to the primary goal of education. Some argue that it
is to teach basic skills;175 others maintain that it is to socialize

students; 7 6 and still others contend that it is to develop creative
mental capacity.177 Not surprisingly, there is no consensus about
how best to teach or how to measure what has been taught.? 8 In

a medical malpractice action, an expert can testify as to the correct and accepted standard that the physician should have followed. No expert could testify to a similar standard in education.
In this regard, the exasperated, albeit correct, remarks of the
court in Otero v. Mesa County Valley School District,No. 51, are of

note:
Certainly, if the expert testimony proved anything, it proved that educational theory is not an exact science, and an expert can be found who will
testify to almost anything. Listening to these experts causes one to conclude that if psychiatrists' disagreements are to be compared to differences between educators, psychiatrists are almost of a single mind.179

Besides, even if some conventional educational methods could
be discovered, or at least methods adopted by a substantial por-

tion of the education community, mere deviation from these conventional methods should not be construed as negligence. Such a
171. See generally T. RoADY & W. ANDERSEN, supra note 11.
172. But cf. Elson, supra note 9, at 679-93 (discussing justiciability of standards
for deciding issues of educational negligence). Given the symbiotic relation between the duty concept and the standard of care, see note 139 supra, this is itself
an argument against the creation of a duty to educate on the basis of the educator's alleged professional status.
173. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,12 VAND. L REV. 549
(1959); W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 162.
174. See Shanker, Dangers in the "EducationalMalpractice" Concept, AmERICAN TEACHER 4 (June 1975). The implications of this lack of consensus for judicial
intervention or non-intervention in the establishment of education policy are explored at notes 247-58 infra and accompanying text.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See P. STICKLAND, J. PBHiLPS & W. PHILLipS, supra note 4.
179. 408 F. Supp. 162, 164 (D. Colo. 1975), vacated on proceduralgrounds, 568
F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1978).
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stultified position would discourage experimentation and restrict
the development of better teaching methods. In fact, under certain circumstances, requiring a teacher to follow a particular

methodology may present constitutional problems.180
Student performance on standardized achievement tests has
been suggested as a measure of teacher competence. But
achievement test scores are notoriously inadequate measures.' 8 '

Even were they not, mere poor performance on achievement tests
would be insufficient to establish educational malpractice, absent

proof of some other negligent conduct on the part of the teacher,
182
for the causes of non-learning are numerous.
Moreover, any attempt to establish an acceptable standard of
care by which to measure educational malpractice allegations
must confront the problem of identifying the appropriate community whose standard will be used. "In a suit to recover for a student's failure to learn because of teacher negligence, the standard
of acceptable instruction should be comparative, that is, the level
of skill and learning of the minimally acceptable teacher in the
same or similar communities." 8 3 But what is to be the community? If the standard against which the performance of ghetto
schools and their teachers are evaluated is to be that of other
ghetto schools and teachers, a majority of ghetto schools and
teachers will, by definition, meet the communal standard of care.
But the utility of educational malpractice actions as a vehicle for
improving the quality of these schools will be seriously undermined. Use of a more inclusive community standard, however,
could impose unrealistic, even unattainable, performance expectations upon these educators. The result would be an unfair imposition of liability that would further discourage the qualified
from teaching in these schools. Again, the educational malpractice action as a means to improve educational quality would be
self-defeating.
"The science of pedagogy itself is fraught with different and
180. Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa
1972).

181. Scheelaase v. Woodbury Central Community School Dist., 488 F.2d 237, 244
(8th Cir. 1973) (Bright, J., concurring), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974). See also

Goodman, Testing in Reading: A GeneralCritique, in AccoNTn
ING INSTRUCTION

ILrrY AND

READ-

22 (1973) (detailing inadequacies of reading tests).

182. For a discussion of the problem of determining causation in educational
malpractice actions, see notes 199-227 infra and accompanying text.
183. Comment, supra note 19, at 771.

conflicting theories of how and what a child should be taught," observed the Peter W. court. 8 4 Influenced by this consideration, the
courts that have been presented with educational malpractice
claims have tended to move with great caution. Both the California court in Peter W. and the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, in Donohue held that, in a suit for educational negligence, a workable standard of care was simply inconceivable. 185
The New York Court of Appeals, however, while affirming the Appellate Division's holding in Donohue, stated, "Nor would creation
of a standard with which to judge an educator's performance of
86
that duty necessarily pose an insurmountable obstacle."'
The judiciary's experience in the education finance cases suggests that the New York court's optimism is unwarranted.187 In
the public school financing area, the courts have experienced
grave difficulties in arriving at an ascertainable standard by which
to identify what an adequate education is, much less how it can
be achieved.188 The history of the courts' handling of the school
finance issue teaches not that the courts cannot
decide issues concerning the quality of educational services. Rather, its
lesson is that courts should be wary of determining what an adequate or
minimum quality education requires, since there is no empirical evidence,
no agreement among practitioners or experts, no social or moral consensus, and no commonsense rationale that a court can use, without serious
reservation or qualification, to define
189 what constitutes adequate or minimum quality educational services.

It is a lesson with negative implications for the recognition of a
cause of action for educational malpractice.
Injury. In addition to establishing a duty of care and a breach
of that duty, a plaintiff in negligence must show that he or she has
suffered a legally compensable injury.S0 Commentators favoring
a cause of action for educational malpractice have tended to leap
184. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 860-61 (1976).
185. Id. at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861; Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School
Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 33-34, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878-79 (1978).
186. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979).
187. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971); 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S.
907 (1977); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976
(1973); 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973); 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975); 67 NJ. 333, 339
A.2d 193 (1975); 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976); 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976); 70
N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).
188. Coons, Recent Trends in Science Fiction: Serrano Among the People of
Number, in EDUcATIoN, Socr4 ScIENcE AND THE JuDicLur PROCESS 60 (R. Rist & R.
Anson eds. 1977); Note, Robinson v. Cahill: A Case Study in Judicial Self-Legitimization, 8 RuT.-CAM. L. J. 508 (1977).
189. Elson, supra note 9, at 689.
190. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 848, 902 (1965).
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this analytic barrier by simple assumption.191 But defining his or
her injury in a legally cognizable fashion presents the educational

malpractice plaintiff with a problem at least as intractable as that
of establishing duty or fixing the standard of care.
The virtual unanimity of the courts in denying that any harm
incurred by educational negligence conforms to the accepted un-

derstanding of tortious injury stands in stark contrast to the commentators' confidence. In Peter W., for example, the court found

"no reasonable 'degree of certainty that... plaintiff suffered injury' within the meaning of the law of negligence."192 This lan-

guage was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, in Donohue which went on to add that the law was "not

intended to protect against the 'injury' of ignorance, for every in-

93
dividual is born lacking knowledge, education and experience."1
According to this reasoning, the failure to teach has left the educational malpractice plaintiff no worse off when he left school
than when he entered. As the court wrote in rejecting Gregory
B.'s claim that he had been unconstitutionally confined because
the education offered him had been inadequate:

How is such 'inadequacy" to be measured?
nothing, that is to say, not going to school?...
assume that a student, even in a school which
is educationally better served than without an

Against the inadequacy of
[A] Court may reasonably
falls below the median...
education at all. 9 4

The principal difficulties attending the recognition of educational deficiency as a tort injury are two-fold. First, the educational malpractice plaintiff has lost an expectancy interest or

failed to receive a benefit. But the law of tort does not generally
compensate for lost expectancies or benefits.195 In Moch v. Rens191. E.g., Note, supra note 58, at 48 ("hat plaintiffs suffer harm ...
table ...

is indispu-

."); Comment, supra note 14, at 118 ('This Comment builds upon the

premise that an inability to read or write at an adequate level constitutes an injury.") For a more careful analysis of injury by a commentator favoring a cause of
action for educational malpractice, see Comment, supra note 8, at 579-82.
192. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 825, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (1976).
193. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 31-32, 3536, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878, 880 (1978). See also Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64 App.
Div. 2d 369, 388-89, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 118 (1978) (Damiani, J., dissenting).
194. In re Gregory B., 88 Misc. 2d 313, 317-18, 387 N.Y.S.2d 380, 384 (Fain. Ct.
1976) (emphasis in the original). Cf. also Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d
689 (1967) (denying recovery for "wrongful life").
195. But see Lucas v. Hanm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961)
(allowing recovery for benefits plaintiff probably would have received, had it not
been for attorney malpractice).

selaer Water Co., for example, Judge Cardozo held that a municipal contractor's failure to furnish a supply of water adequate to
fight a fire amounted to the denial of a benefit and not the commission of a legal wrong.196 In other words, it was not an injury at
all. The situation of a student who fails to learn because of
teacher negligence would be closely analogous.
Second, calculation of damages for non-learning would be almost impossible. In the very apposite case of Sioux Tribe v.
United States, the United States Court of Claims recognized that
Indian children who had been denied educational benefits which
the government should have provided under the terms of a treaty,
had suffered a substantial loss.19 7 But the court denied recovery
because the monetary value of the loss could not be calculated
with sufficient certainty. If the educational malpractice plaintiffs
claim is that he has suffered psychological harm in terms of lowered self-esteem, the value of literacy to an individual is so highly
personal as to be speculative.198 On the other hand, if the claim is
one for loss of prospective wages, the plaintiff is again asserting a
mere expectation, the loss of a possible economic advantage. Education to a particular level does not and cannot assure a certain
level of income. The inability of the educational malpractice plaintiff to assert an injury cognizable at law, thus, remains fatal to recognition of the cause of action.
Causation. Even were it possible for the educational malpractice plaintiff to conform his or her claim to negligence law's model
of duty, standard of care, and injury, the largest hurdle of all
would still await-establishing a causal link between the negligent education and his or her own failure to learn.199 The courts'
196. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
197. 84 Ct. CL 16 (1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 740 (1937).
198. But see Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 738, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)

(allowing recovery for psychological damages in the absence of accompanying
physical injury). Dillion, however, has not been overwhelmingly endorsed by

other jurisdications and has been explicitly rejected by some. See Note, Negligent
Infliction of Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in Californiaand Other
States, 25 HAST. L. REV. 1248 (1974). It remains true, therefore, that courts still

treat allegations of mental distress with great caution, if not outright suspicion.
Note, however, that great stress was laid on plaintiffs psychological damage in Hoffman ....
Given the nature of the defendant's negligence...
and the particularly sympathetic nature of the plaintiffs situation, the allowance of psychological damages by the lower court in Hoffman is understandable. In similar fact situations, claims of such injury are appropriate,
but Hoffman does not representthe typical case.

Comment, supra note 8, at 580 n.115 (emphasis added).
199. This is best evidenced by the testimony of those favoring an educational
malpractice cause of action, see Comment, supra note 8, at 596 ("plaintiffs most
difficult task"); Note, supra note 11, at 341 ("very difficult to show the requisite
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discussion of injury suggests that one could argue that a failure to
teach does not cause a state of illiteracy because a child is born
ignorant of how to read or write. Negligent education, therefore,
cannot be said to produce a state that would not otherwise exist.
Taking a less cynical view, the causes of non-learning are so numerous and ill-understood that, as a matter of law, causation
200
probably cannot be proven.
Causation is perhaps one of the most difficult of all jurispruden-

tial concepts. 201 In tort, the negligence plaintiff must prove, first,

2
that the defendant's conduct was in fact the cause of his injury 02
and, second, that not only was it the factual cause but also that it
was the proximate cause of the injury.203 In dealing with cause in

fact the test commonly applied by the courts is the so-called "but
for" rule. The first Restatement of Torts states the rule thus:

"Where a person can prove that but for the tortious interference
causal relationship"). See also Note, supra note 15, at 383, 396-99; Comment, supra
note 14, at 130-32.
200. See M. SORGEN, P. DUFFY, W. KAPLIN & E. MARGOLIN, STATE, SCHOOL AND

FAMILY § 11-3 (1973):
It is exceedingly difficult to evaluate current forms of public classification
or to accurately determine their effect on scholastic achievement, because
one cannot isolate the extent to which the manner in which the school
treats children is determinative of their performances.
Contra Comment, supra note 14, at 131 ("mere fact that certain elements of a
cause of action are difficult to prove should not be the crucial factor in categorically denying a cause of action"). See also note 1 supra (lack of public consensus
regarding the causes of non-learning).
201. Cause, as a basis of liability by virtue of its quality of wrongness, has
been frequently expressed in terms of unlawfulness, intent, blame, fault,
deceit, negligence-summed up as culpability. Cause has been frequently
characterized as direct, proximate, imputed, presumed, inducing, efficient,
active, culpable, and by many other descriptive terms. Moreover, liability
based on the cause concept is frequently qualified or limited by cause
characterized as remote, passive, sole, intervening, independent, superseding, supervening, and similar terms. The causation doctrinal superstructure for determining liability is extensive, refined, complicated in detail, and metaphysical both in thought and terminology. It was the creation of the nineteenth century during the transition period from medieval
to modern tort law, and designed as a means of limiting liability, primarily
by the judge as opposed to a jury. As a basis for the adjudication of litigated tort cases it has had a weird history and has resulted in great confusion of legal theory, endless, and arid legal disquisition, and many
injustices to litigants.
Green, Duties,Risks, CausationDoctrines,41 TEx. L REV. 42, 42-43 (1962) (emphasis in the original). Anyone who has ever studied the doctrine of causation can
sympathize with this indictment Nevertheless, as a matter of legal, if not philosophic, analysis it remains with us, in the law of torts as well as the law of crimes.
202. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 236-44.
203. Id. at 250-70.

of another, he would have received.., a specific [outcome] from
a transaction, he is entitled to full damages for the loss which has
thus been caused to him. .... 204 It follows that, where the loss
would have been sustained without defendant's negligent conduct, that conduct cannot legally be said to be a cause of the in5
jury.20
The multiplicity of factors affecting the learning process, coupled with the lack of any clear understanding of the impact on
learning of any one of those factors, makes it virtually impossible
to prove that the educator's negligence was a cause in fact of a
student's illiteracy.206 Social, economic, emotional, and cultural
factors all play an essential and immeasurable role in learning. In
addition to innate intellectual ability, a child's failure to learn
may be affected by home environment, peer pressure, attitude,
motivation, personality, student-teacher interaction, 207 class size,
and faculty experience. It will be readily perceived that many of
these factors are beyond the control of schools and teachers.
Some may be uncontrollable by anyone. In such a situation,
where it may be readily inferred that a student's illiteracy resulted from other causes, it would be manifestly unjust to hold

20 8
educators liable for non-learning.
Recognizing this, the Peter W. court held that the difficulties in
establishing causation were another reason for refusing to entertain a suit for educational malpractice.

[TJhe achievement of literacy in the schools, or its failure, are influenced
by a host of factors which affect the pupil subjectively, from outside the
formal teaching process, and beyond the control of its ministers. They
may be physical, neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental; they
204. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 912, commentf at 584 (1939).
205. But see Note, supra note 58, at 45 n.127; Comment, supra note 14, at 131 &
n.102, advocating that, because of the interaction of so many causal factors, the

"substantial factor" test is more appropriate for an educational malpractice action
than the "but for" test. Under the "substantial factor" test, where multiple factors
converge to cause the plaintiff's injury, the defendant remains liable, if his or her
conduct was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. But even under the "substantial factor" test, each factor operating alone
must have been sufficient to have caused the result. The classic case is where a
fire, set by the defendant, joins another, and the plaintiff's property is burned; but

either one of the fires could have burned the property by itself. See, e.g., Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920).
206. See Hechinger, No One Knows What Makes A Good School, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 13, 1977, § 12, at 1, col. 1. Indirectly, this is also attested to by the very hypotheticals advanced by educational malpractice advocates to suggest where
cause in fact might be found. The examples used are as ethereal as the proposed
cause of action itself; e.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 583 n.124 ("able student...
totally denied access to the written word").
207. See Sprinthall &Sprinthall, Learning and the Classroom, in EDUcATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY 159-60 (1969) (students affect the way adult teaches, because teacher
will tend to focus on responsive pupils).
208. See L. STAm, supra note 4, at 8; Elson, supra note 9, at 689.
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209
may be present but not perceived, recognized but not identified.

This, too, was quoted with approval by the New York appellate
court in Donohue, adding the curt but common sense observation,
"The failure to learn does not bespeak a failure to teach."210
The courts' wisdom is illustrated by the problems of proof that
a plaintiff would encounter, were a cause of action for educational
malpractice to be allowed to proceed to trial.21 ' Because causation in the education field would be beyond the normal understanding of the average lay juror, the plaintiff would have to rely
upon expert testimony. But such testimony would either be unavailable or so vehemently contested as to be valueless, due to
the widespread disagreement among educators concerning how
children learn and, thus, how they should be taught. Because students learn at different rates and in different ways, it is difficult to
employ scientific methodology to establish the most appropriate
teaching behavior in any given situation. The result is an almost
total absence of scientific evidence and theoretical consensus as
to how best to teach.212 Expert testimony, therefore, would only
heighten the jury's confusion and pave the way for arbitrary verdicts. 213
In view of the deficiencies in expert testimony, at least one advocate of a cause of action for educational malpractice has pro209. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (1976) (footnote omitted).
210. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 33-34, 36,
407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878, 881 (1978). See also Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School
Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 446, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1355, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (1979) (Wachter, J., concurring); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 389, 410
N.Y.S.2d 99, 118 (1978) (Damiani, J., dissenting).
211. Because the thesis of this article is that a cause of action for educational
malpractice should not be recognized, a detailed discussion of the problems of
proof is technically beyond its scope. Problems of proof would, in fact, arise only
if the cause of action were entertained, and a suit were allowed to proceed to the
trier of fact. The problems are briefly mentioned here only to illustrate the difficulties in establishing causation in fact that argue against permitting such causes
of action. See also note 43 supra. For more in-depth treatment of the problems of
proof in educational malpractice actions, see Comment, supra note 19, at 790-801;
Comment, supra note 8, at 582-85.
212. See B. BLOOM, HuMAN CHARACTERISTICS AND SCHOOL LEARNING (1976); M.
SORGEN, P. DuFFY, W. KAPLIN & E. MARGOLIN, supra note 200, at § 11.2 ("our knowledge... is remarkably primitive").
213. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376
(1979), presents a sitution in which expert testimony was useful and should perhaps have been successful. But there the allegation was that the plaintiff had
been misassigned in the first place, not that he had failed to receive adequate instruction within the class to which he was assigned.

posed a comparative method of proof "that relies on inferences
drawn from circumstantial evidence .... -"214 Under this method
of proof, plaintiff would establish causation in fact
by proving that a class of which he is a member peformed significantly
worse [on standardized achievement tests] than did classes identical in
all essential
respects except that they were not taught by the defendant
2 15
teacher.

Leaving aside objections to standardized tests as measures of
anything other than the ability to take a test,21 6 this proposed
method of proof, proceeding as it does from an apparently endemic legal naivet6 regarding social science methodology and
standards of proof,217 suffers from several flaws. First of all, it
would be impossible to identify appropriate comparison classes
"identical in all essential respects," because no one knows what
the "essential respects" are.2 18 Second, because of the vast
number of possibly relevant factors, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to hold all factors, other than teacher performance, con-.
stant over time. Third, even if the relevant factors could be
identified and held constant, the method of proof proposed would
be valid only if employed over a multi-year period. Poor performance by a teacher's classes in any given year would not necessarily indicate teacher incompetence but might be more reasonably
attributed to some situation unique to that year. The method of
proof, thus, would be inapplicable to beginning or relatively inexperienced teachers, as well as to elderly teachers who, though
previously competent, had become incompetent due, perhaps, to
senility. Fourth, this comparative method of proof would be limited to class actions and would not be readily available to individual plaintiffs like Donohue and Peter W. Indeed, this method
would not even be relevant to proving the generalized allegations
of those plaintiffs. Peter W. and Donohue did not argue that a
specific teacher or teachers or an identifiable program were at
fault. Their contentions were much simpler. They just argued
that they had graduated unprepared and that someone-other
than themselves-ought to pay for that.
Because it "seems impossible to prove that the substandard result was not the consequence of the student's own lack of intelli214. Comment, supra note 19, at 790.
215. Id. at 790-91. Presumably the method is intended to be applied to compari-

sons between school districts and between schools within a single district, as well
as to teachers.
216. See note 181 supra and accompanying test. See also C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (1972)

(teacher quality does not have much effect on achievement test scores).
217. See Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L REV. 150 (1955); A. DAVIS, THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA

218. See notes 206-09 supra and accompanying text.

(1974).
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gence, aptitude, diligence, attitude, ambition, or general
educability,"219 the educational malpractice advocate would have
to rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.220 But the lack of
any demonstrable correlation between teacher quality, test
scores, cognitive skills, and economic success should defeat such
reliance. 2 21
Therefore, in a situation where variables that are uncontrollable
by the defendant play such a predominant role in causing the alleged injury, not only should liability not attach but also, in the
interest of judicial economy, the cause of action should not be entertained in the first place.
Moreover, even were the causal relationship between failure to
learn and failure to teach less speculative and remote, courts
might still deny recovery for failure to prove proximate causation.
While it may be that "the educational process would be meaningless if some kind of causal relationship between the behavior of
teachers and learning by students did not exist,"222 more than
this is required by the law of negligence. The doctrine of proximate causation requires that the plaintiffs injury be the natural,
probable, and foreseeable consequence of the defendant's conduct. 223 To be held liable, the defendant must have been able to
foresee that a breach of the duty of care owed to the defendant
would cause not only an injury to the plaintiff (cause in fact) but
also the particulartype of injury actually suffered by the plaintiff.
Of course, were some scientifically valid correlation to be demonstrated between learning and classroom methods, common sense
would almost inevitably point to the conclusion that non-learning
224
was a clearly foreseeable risk of poor classroom performance.
219. Comment, supra note 19, at 790.
220. See Byrne v. Boadle, 2 L & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D, comment d at 157-58. Whether the doctrine would
even be available is, in fact, problematic. Res ipsa loquitur has been used to es-

tablish causation in medical malpractice actions, see, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25
Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944), but is not applied in attorney malpractice cases, see
Wade, The Attorney's Liabilityfor Negligence, in T. ROADY & W. ANDERSEN, supra
note 11, at 228. For criticism of the doctrine and suggestions that the courts should
abandon it, see Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CAInF. L. REV. 183
(1949); Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARv. L. REV. 643

(1950).
221. C.

JENCKS,

supra note 216.

222. Comment, supra note 8, at 582 (emphasis in the original).
223. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 250-70.

224. This may account for the brief, almost offhand treatment that probable
cause has been accorded by the advocates of an educational malpractice cause of

But in Donohue the lower court held that
the plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed because of the practical impossibility of demonstrating that a breach of the alleged common law and
statutory duties was the proximate cause of his failure to learn ....
[I]t
is virtually impossible to calculate to what extent, if any, the defendant's
acts or omissions proximately
caused the plaintiff's inability to read at his
22 5
appropriate grade level.

The Donohue court may have been in error. But proximate
cause is often a vehicle for the expression of judicial policy concerns that affect recognition of a negligence cause of action.2 26
The language of proximate cause may be used to limit legal re-

sponsibility for conduct that has been proven to be a cause in
fact. Thus, even if educational misfeasance could be proven to be

a cause in fact of functional illiteracy, the educational malpractice
plaintiff, having established all the other elements of a negligence
cause of action, could still be denied recovery on a conservative
view of proximate cause. Whether that should or should not be
the case, however, requires an examination of the policy considerations and consequences that underlie the educational malprac-

tice debate. 227

action. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 585 & 596; Note, supra note 11, at 354;
Comment, supra note 19, at 768.
225. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 35, 407
N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (1978) (emphasis added).
226. Although courts do balance policy considerations under the rubric of proximate cause, some have suggested the causal relation is simply a question of fact
and that policy should only be considered in the determination of duty; see, e.g.,
Green, The CausalRelation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L REv. 543 (1962).
227. Were a suit for educational malpractice to be allowed to proceed, rather
than being summarily dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, the plaintiff
would encounter still other problems. While detailed consideration of these issues
is not relevant here, because this article takes the position that such causes of action should not be entertained, some of them may be briefly reognized.
Whatever theory the educational malpractice plaintiff proceeds under, all of the
usual defenses will presumably be available to the defendant. For example, in a
suit bottomed on a negligence theory, the defendant may plead contributory negligence in those jurisdictions that still recognize this defense. See Sugarman, supra
note 4, at 247; Abel, Can a Student Sue the Schools for EducationalMalpractice?,
44 HARv. EDUC. REV. 416, 428 (1974). The educational malpractice defendant may
allege and prove that a plaintiff-student failed to attend class, exhibited a negative
attitude toward learning, did not do assignments, or seldom paid attention in class,
thereby causing his own injury. Such a defense, however, would be unavailable in
those jurisdictions that make it impossible for a child below a certain age to be
contributorily negligent. See W. PRossER, supra note 11, at 156-57, 419 &n.31, 447 &
n.82. Even in jurisdictions where such a defense is theoretically available, courts
are reluctant to attribute contributory negligence to a child. See, e.g., Bear v.
Auguy, 164 Neb. 756, 768, 83 N.W.2d 559, 567 (1957) (extreme situation required to
bar child from recovery due to contributory negligence). On the other hand, to the
extent that a student's age would limit the availability of affrmative defenses, educational malpractice would approach becoming a strict liability tort, and this consequence courts should not overlook in deciding whether or not to recognize it as
a cause of action.
Against a plaintiff-parent, an educational malpractice defendant might argue
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IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
As has already been seen, the courts' legal analyses of educathat the parent failed to encourage the child to read, did not assist in developing
literacy skills, or created a home environment not conducive to study. Alternatively, the defendant might turn the tables on the parent-plaintiff by alleging that,

once the parent knew or should have known that the public school system was
failing to fulfill its educational mission, the parent had a duty to exercise reasonable care to see that other provisions were made for the child's education.

These positions are futher complicated by the fact that the negligence of the
child may be imputed to the parent, although the reverse is not true: Parental
negligence cannot bar the child from recovery. See, e.g., Welter v. Curry, 260 Ark.
287, 302, 539 S.W.2d 264, 273 (1976) (child's contributory negligence may be asserted against parent); contra Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Iowa
1976) (child's contributory negligence does not bar parental recovery).
For further discussion of defense problems in this area, including the availability of a student's suit against his or her parents for failure to ensure their education, the impact of intra-familial immunity, and the possibility of an educational
malpractice defendant impleading parents as third-party defendants, see Note,
supra note 58, at 52-55.
In those jurisdictions that have abandoned contributory negligence in favor of
comparative fault, e.g., Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532
P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), any or all of the above considerations would
work to limit the educational malpractice defendant's liability. See generally V.
SCHWARTZ, COmPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974). Indeed, they may very well limit defendants' liability to such an extent in so many cases that the question must arise
whether recognizing the cause of action is worth the effort.
The defense of assumption of risk, however, would not be available, since attendance is not voluntary. Besides, it would be a strange argument for an educator to make. But see note 292 infra.
But the most effective defense would remain the denial of any causal relationship between the harm allegedly suffered and the negligent conduct asserted. See
notes 199-226 supra and accompanying text.
The educational malpractice plaintiff would also have to consider the question of
what is the appropriate remedy to be sought. In the public school context, at least
three alternative forms of relief would be available: (1) monetary damages, compensating the plaintiff for the disability suffered and its effect on future earnings
potential, (2) provision of or payment for remedial education, or (3) dismissal of
incompetent teachers.
Removal of incompetent teachers would have the advantage of avoiding the potentially detrimental and far-reaching effects of substantial compensatory and punitive damage awards. But, while this alternative would eliminate future harm, it
will do nothing to recompense the student-plaintiffs who have already been subjected to the incompetent teacher or teachers. Moreover, where teacher union
contracts are involved, dismissal may not be so easily accomplished, particularly if
the contract provision permitting removal "for cause" does not recognize negligence or incompetence as a valid "cause." See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Ordering the defendant to make available to the defendant an appropriate remedial program would simply involve reassigning the defendant to the public school
system that produced the injury in the first place, a result anomalous in the extreme. Remedial instruction, in fact, is the most illogical of the alternative remedies, for it would neither deter future harm nor make whole those students who

tional malpractice claims have been strongly influenced by considerations of public policy.228 Conversely, the logical constructs
of legal reasoning have also shaped their policy analyses. 22 9 In
Peter W., for example, the court indicated that the lack of "readily
acceptable standards of care, or cause, or injury" was a policy factor that argued against recognizing educational malpractice as a
cause of action.2 30 In Donohue, on the other hand, the New York
Court of Appeals relied almost exclusively on public policy to
hold that, although such standards could be framed, the courts
should make no effort to frame them.23 1 Even the lower court in
Hoffman, though permitting a cause of action for negligence in achad been subjected to the inadequate instruction. Moreover, for those who see educational malpractice suits as a means of reforming public education, the remedy
of additional instruction offers no prospect for improving the regular school program. In short, the only thing that remedial instruction, as a remedy in an educational malpractice action, has to commend it is that, like dismissal of incompetent
teachers, it would avoid the substantial monetary awards that would be contrary
to sound public policy and deter insincere plaintiffs merely seeking a windfall.
On the other hand, "the award of money damages for diminished earnings could
be a potentially crushing burden upon a school district, especially in a class action." Comment, supra note 19, at 759 (footnotes omitted). Recall that the plaintiff
in Donohue sought five million dollars ($5,000,000); Hoffman was willing to settle
for a mere five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000). But such awards, particularly
where they attempted to restore lost future earning potential, would be almost
wholly speculative. See note 197 supra and accompanying text. As has already
been seen, the difficulty of calculating damages for non-learning weighs against its
recognition as a tort injury. See notes 190-98 supra and accompanying text.
Of course, the remedies which would be available and appropriate would depend upon the theory under which the educational malpractice action was
brought. For example, if the suit were premised on a contract theory, the damages
recoverable should be limited to the benefit of the bargain. But what was the bargain? See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text. And a plaintiff suing on contract would be under a duty to minimize his or her damages, but a litigant resting
on misrepresentation could avoid this requirement. See W. PROSSER, supra note
11, at 422-24.
For further discussion of the remedies available to educational malpractice
plaintiffs and the problems attendant on each, see Comment, supra note 8, at 581,
595, 596; Note, supra note 11, at 355; Note, supra note 58, at 56.58; Comment, supra
note 19, at 757-60.
The nature and extent of the remedies available in educational malpractice
suits, however, are considerations intimately related to the fundamental public
policy issues which should determine whether such a cause of action should be
recognized or not.
228. See notes 28-32, 37-49, 163-66 & 226-27 supra and accompanying text.
229. This judicial tendency to intermingle law and policy has been severely
criticized by some commentators; see, e.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 586 ("...
confusing real policy issues with abstract pleading arguments only weakens respect for judicial reasoning.. ."). But see W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 325 ("..
considerations of policy
only an expression of the sum total of...
'duty' is...
230. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824, 131
CaL Rptr. 854, 860 (1976).
231. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443-44, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1354-55, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979).
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ademic instruction, was moved to stress the limited nature of its
holding. Its decision, the court said,
does not mean that the parents of the Johnnies who cannot read may flock
to the courts and automatically obtain redress. Nor does it mean that the
parents of all the Janies whose delicate egos were upset because they did
not get the gold stars they deserved will obtain redress. If the door to "educational torts". . is to be opened ... it will not be by this case .... 232

The Court of Appeals, however, would not go even that far and
flatly held that it was the public policy of the State of New York
that no cause of action should exist for educational malpractice.233 Clearly, a judicial reluctance to intervene in the operation
of the schools has been a pervasive theme in the educational malpractice litigation.
This reluctance has been motivated by extra-legal concerns that
go far beyond the mere technicalities of pleading. The principal
policy objections to recognition of a cause of action for educational malpractice appear to be of two types. The first consists of
concerns internal to the judiciary. Among these is the impact
such recognition would have on the courts; in particular, it is
feared that the result would be to burden the courts with a flood
of claims, many of which would be frivolous if not, in fact, feigned.
At the same time, there is acute awareness that most judges possess little, if any, expertise in the complex educational issues that
are and would be involved in malpractice suits. 2 34 The second set
of objections proceeds from a consideration of matters external to
the judiciary. On the one hand, the courts have taken judicial notice of the existence of alternative procedures for correcting, reforming, or deterring incompetent instruction. 235 On the other
hand, grave doubt has been expressed as to the desirability of the
consequences that would flow from recognizing an educational
malpractice cause of action. The impact on education might be
232. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 379-80, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 110

(1978). Thus, the court sought to ground its decision on a characterization of the
defendant school board's negligence as misfeasance, expressly declining to recognize suits for nonfeasance. As for the utility of the distinction, see notes 13 & 56
supra and accompanying text.
233. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 126, 400 N.E.2d 317, 320, 424
N.Y.S.2d 376, 379 (1979).

234. The absence of any judicially manageable standards is no doubt also a factor of the courts' perceived incompetence; see notes 172-79 & 184-89 supra and accompanying text.
235. A related, though slightly different, policy argument is that judicial inter-

vention would contravene principles of democratic government; regarding this argument, see note 264 infra.

financial, adding to the costs of the already beleagured public
schools, or behavioral, disrupting classroom relationships and encouraging "defensive" teaching. Or the impact might be both. In
any event, the purported benefits of holding the educational malpractitioner liable would be more than offset by the negative consequences.
Advocates of a cause of action for educational malpractice, of
course, denigrate the idea that recognition of such a cause will
lead either to a flood of litigation or to disruption of the educational process. 236 The rationale for refusing to exempt doctors
from liability for malpractice is, these advocates contend, equally
applicable to teachers. They are skeptical of the feasibility of procedures other than judicial for satisfying claims of improper or incompetent instruction. As for the problem of judicial
understanding, the courts, they confidently opine, can "intelligently sift the wheat from the chaff."237
But, it can be argued, that is exactly what the courts have already done in refusing to recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice. Providing a judicial remedy for the infliction
of educational injury would have wider consequences than simply
allowing compensation to a few individual students for the harms
they have allegedly suffered at the hands of the public schools.
However, they may have confused their policy analyses with their
legal arguments, the courts seem to have reached the right result
in the educational malpractice cases.
236. For discussions of the policy issues underlying judicial reticence in the educational malpractice cases by advocates of such a cause of action, see Comment,
supra note 8, at 585-93; Elson, supra note 9, at 645-93; Note, supra note 58, at 33-41;
Comment, supra note 19, at 760-66.
* 237. See Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding physician liable in negligence), modified on other grounds, 60 App. Div. 2d 80,
400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977):
What statute or theory of law grants preferential treatment or immunity
to the medical profession? The court is the guardian of the rights of all
the citizenry, not only a chosen few .... To use the worn-out, rejected
cliche of "public policy" is to single out and grant preferential treatment
to the medical profession over all other professions and enterprises where
malpractice could result in payment of ensuing resultant damages. This
was never truly contemplated by either the general public, the Legislature
or the Court. This court further believes that contrary to the fear ... as
to "fraudulent claims" or a "sensible stopping point", that the Judiciary
can intelligently sift the wheat from the chaff and that it has the ability to
succinctly deal with any attempted fraudulent scheme or claim and make
short shrift thereof.
Id. at 231-32, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 211. As could be expected, this passage from Park is
an oft-quoted favorite of those who wish to see an educational malpractice cause
of action recognized; see, e.g., Elson, supra note 9, at n.42.
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Internal Concerns
The courts' concern for the judicial effect of creating this new
cause of action has perhaps been most succinctly stated by the
Court of Appeals in Donohue.
To entertain a cause of action for "educational malpractice" would require
the courts not merely to make judgments as to the validity of broad educational policies-a course we have unalteringly eschewed in the past-but,
more importantly,
to sit in review of the day-to-day implementation of
23
those policies. a

In other words, a lack of judicial expertise in the subject matter
coupled with the undue burden to be placed upon the courts cautions against recognizing the cause of action. And, indeed, the potential for frivolous claims would appear to be almost limitless. In
In re Gregory B., for example, one of the students' allegations
was that "their teachers are mean to them."239 The court was not
impressed.
Excessive litigation. But the claim that a flood of litigation will
result is one that can be (and has been) 240 raised against the recognition of any new cause of action. Were such a consideration to
be decisive, the law would be incapable of growth and adaptation.
"It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it,
even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation' and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny
relief on such grounds. '24 1 Without more, the "excessive litigation" argument simply proves too much, and the advocates of a
cause of action for educational malpractice are on firm ground in
rejecting it as a general principle.
When one moves from a generalized to a particularized analysis, however, objections to the potential impact upon the courts of
this new cause of action become weightier.242 The commentators
238. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979).
239. 88 Misc. 2d 313, 318, 387 N.Y.S.2d 380, 385 (1976).
240. See, e.g., note 11 supra (products liability).
241. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 51. It must be noted, however, that Prosser
confines his endorsement of new causes of action to "wrongs that deserve" a remedy (emphasis added). Thus, advocates of a cause of action for educational malpractice must bear the burden of demonstrating that a genuine need for relief is
present, a burden that, so far, they have not successfully borne.
242. An alternative objection related to the potential volume of litigation is that,
if recognizing educational malpractice as a cause of action would result in a substantial amount of litigation, the cost to the defendant school boards and teachers
would be such as to detrimentally effect the overall quality of education. Any ben-

have sought to dismiss the courts' fears of excessive litigation by
*analogizing educational malpractice claims to other types of professional malpractice actions.
Comparing educational malpractice to other "new" types of malpractice
actions,... there is no reason to differentiate between educational malpractice and
other forms of malpractice litigation which currently congest
243
the courts.

Such an argument, however, (1) rests upon a crucial admission
and (2) overlooks a critical, empirical fact.
The empirical fact overlooked is the simple number of potential
plaintiffs, were an educational *malpractice cause of action to be
recognized. Ironically enough, the compulsory education lawsthe very bedrock of many of the legal theories for recognizing the
cause of action-, coupled with the existence of a publicly
financed school system, insure that many more will be subjected
to education than will ever consult a doctor, a lawyer, or an architect.244
The crucial admission is that other forms of malpractice litigation are already congesting the courts. 245 Why add to that congestion? In fact, as a logical matter, this argument can just as easily
cut the other way-abandon the other malpractice causes of action for the reasons that the courts have declined to recognize educational malpractice as a viable cause of action. Like its
counterpart, the "excessive litigation" argument, this argument,
too, proves too much.
The courts' fears of excessive litigation, therefore, are not as
groundless as the commentators suggest. Those fears, moreover,
are occasioned by the nature and depth, as well as the breadth, of
judicial involvement-that is contemplated by educational malpractice litigation. 2 Generally, educational malpractice advocates
have sought to conduct a broad and total attack upon the public
school program. The object has been reform, and the choices
presented to the courts have been intricate. So far, the courts
have declined to make such choices for the laudibly candid reason that they wouldn't know what they are doing.
efit to individual plaintiffs would, then, be overshadowed by the negative systemic
impact. For a discussion of the potential costs of recognizing educational malpractice as a cause of action, see notes 268-92 infra and accompanying text. Because
this concern is not related to the internal operation of the judiciary, however, it is
not considered at this point.
243. Note, supra note 11, at 342 &351 (footnote omitted).
244. See generally T. ROADY & W. ANDERSEN, supra note 11.
245. See IL JALEs, CRIsis n ThE COURTS (rev. ed. 1971).

246. See note 238 supra and accompanying text see also In re Gregory B., 88
Misc. 2d 313, 317, 387 N.Y.S.2d 380, 384 (1976).
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Judicial expertise. In addition to a fear of excessive and possibly fraudulent claims that could unduly burden the courts, the educational malpractice decisions have reflected a concern for
judicial inability to formulate standards for teaching and learning.
Where educators themselves have failed, there appears little reason to believe that courts would be successful. "Education," the
Supreme Court has noted, ". .. presents a myraid of 'intractable
economic, social, and even philosophical problems.'- 247 Judicial
decisionmakers, however, are untrained in the substantive issues
of pedagogical policy and, even if they were, lack adequate information gathering and deliberative processes to make an informed
evaluation of them.248 Recognizing this, the lower court in Donohue was moved to observe,
The courts are an inappropriate forum to test the efficacy of educational
programs and pedagogical methods. That judicial interference would be
the inevitable result of the recognition of [educational malpractice as a
cause of action] is clear from the fact that in presenting their case, plaintiffs would, of necessity, call upon [the courts] to decide whether they
should have been taught one subject instead of another, or whether one
teaching method was more appropriate than another, or whether certain
tests should have been administered or test results interpreted in one way
rather than another, and so on, ad infinitum. It simply is not within the
249
judicial function to evaluate conflicting theories of how best to educate.

As previously discussed, there is no agreement and, in fact, considerable, rancorous dispute among educators as to appropriate
instructional strategies. 250 Some favor holding slow learners
back, others support "tracking" theory, which groups students of
similar learning abilities; still others rely upon a variety of remedial programs to assist those pupils who fall behind.251 It seems
unlikely that the courts can resolve that which educators cannot.
Indeed, even some of the educational malpractice critics have
conceded that "[t] here is ... no doubt that the formulation and
247. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973), quoting
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (upholding state welfare regulation). The Court's point was that the judiciary is an even more inappropriate forum of overseeing the daily operation of the school system than it is for operating
the welfare system.
248. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1129 (1969); Kuriloff, Truc & Kirp, Legal Reform and Educational Change: The
Pennsylvania Case, 41 EXCEPTIONAL Cmn RN 35, 41 (1974); D. HoRowrrz, THE

CouaTs AND SOcIAL PoLicy 33-56 (1977).
249. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 34, 407
N.Y.S.2d 874, 879 (1978).
250. See notes 172-89 supra and accompanying text.
251. See Shanker, supra note 174, at 4.

implementation of educational policy, which is inevitable in the
determination of issues of educational [malpractice], can be accomplished more effectively by school officials than by judges."252
One need not subscribe to the romantic idea that the teacher always knows best 253 to believe that career teachers and school administrators are more qualified to formulate educational policy
than are courts. The teacher may not know best, but he or she
probably knows better. As the Supreme Court put the matter in
Hortonville Junior School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education
Association,
Policymaking is a process of prudential judgment, and we are not prepared to say that a judge can generally make a better policy judgment or
...
as good a judgment as the School Board, which is intimately familiar
with all the needs of the school district, or that a school board must, at the
risk of suspending school operations, wend
its way through judicial
254
processes not mandated by the legislature.

The determination of the requisite level of instructional quality
within a school system and how to attain it is a fundamental policy-making function that educators are better equipped to handle
than are courts. The judicial process, therefore, should eschew
discretionary decisions of educator competence.25 5 In fact, the
New York Court of Appeals has gone even farther and has held
that, within the State of New York, educational policy must be
left to the appropriate school authorities.256 If they fail to exercise their powers in an appropriate manner, the remedy should be

legislative or administrative, not judicial. "Such matters as the
competence of teachers . .. are peculiarly appropriate to state
and local administration." 257
As new teaching methods are devised and as urban growth demands
changed patterns of instruction, the only realistic way the state can adjust
is through legislative study, discussion and continuing revision of the controlling statutes. Even if there were some guidelines available to the judiciary, the courts simply cannot provide the empirical research and
252. Elson, supra note 9, at 677.
253. But cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593-94 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(eulogizing teachers generally in the context of a discussion of the Justice's own
"warmly remembered" school days). The statements of Mr. Justice Powell, himself a former school board member, concerning the nature and function of education constitute one of the more curious bodies of judicial opinion in modern
American jurisprudence.
254. 426 U.S. 482, 496 n.5 (1976).
255. See Scheelaase v. Woodbury Central Community School Dist., 488 F.2d 237
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
256. James v. Board of Educ., 42 N.Y.2d 357, 366 N.E.2d 1291, 397 N.Y.S.2d 934
(1977). See also Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 206 N.E.2d 174, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77
(1965) (educational policies are solely the province of state educational authority).
257. Scheelaase v. Woodbury Central Community School Dist., 488 F.2d 237,
243-44 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
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2 58
consultation necessary for intelligent educational planning.

External Concerns
The availability of alternative processes for correcting the
wrongs of which educational malpractice plaintiffs have complained has been yet another policy consideration that has influenced the courts to decline to recognize the proposed cause of
action. While these alternatives are external to the litigation, the
courts could hardly ignore their existence. Nor can the courts fail
to be troubled by the potential consequences of judicial intervention in this peculiarly sensitive area of educational policy.
Alternative procedures. The absence of judicial competence in
the educational field, coupled with the lack of either reliable data
or acceptable theory on which to base a judicial determination, is
a compelling argument against establishing a cause of action for
educational malpractice. But it would not be sufficient, were
there no non-judicial mechanisms for dealing with incompetent
academic instruction. When, however, it is recognized that such
alternatives are already in place and that they provide a more efficient remedy to the problem, the policy argument against judicial
intervention becomes persuasive. Among the extra-legal
processes available to correct educational malpractice are political action, certification procedures that impose minimum qualifications on educators, professional review systems, supervisory
control over teaching behaviors, and school boards' powers to terminate incompetent teachers. 25 9 Parents may also have an opportunity to utilize intrasystem grievance procedures to challenge
the instruction their children are receiving.26 0 Thus far, no educational malpractice plaintiff has alleged, let alone proven, that
these various alternatives are inadequate to prevent or deter negligent or incompetent teaching.
In fact, the plaintiffs in Hoffman and Donohue had not even at258. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affid per curiam
sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
259. See Comment, supra note 8, at 591-92; Comment, supra note 19, at 764.
260. Internal grievance procedures, however, would be inadequate, unless the
parents are aware of their child's learning difficulty while he or she is still an enrolled student and have notice of the availability of the grievance mechanism.

There is, moreover, no certainty that the grievance procedure will produce a resolution acceptable to the parents. The shortcomings of such administrative mechanisms, however, is no argument for ignoring them.

tempted to avail themselves of the administrative remedies available to them. 26' This led the Court of Appeals to state in
Donohue that it could not overlook the right of public school students and their parents to enlist the aid of the State Commissioner of Education to insure that such students were receiving a
proper education.2 62 Under the New York education law, any person aggrieved by any official act or decision of any school officer,
school authority, or meeting concerning any matter within the
purview of the law, or by any other act or decision pertaining to
the public schools, was entitled to seek review of such act or decision by the Commissioner.263 This the plaintiff and his parents
had wholly failed to do.
Moreover, it is not simply the availability of these procedures
but also the legislative intent in creating them that argues against
judicial interference. In most states, the purpose of making educational policy solely the province of the duly constituted educational authority is to remove all matters pertaining to the public
school system, insofar as feasible, from controversy in the
courts.

264

Conceding the need for reform and improvement in American
public education, conceding the need for some form of external
control to assure better teacher and administrative performance,
it does not follow that that external control must be judicial. The
judicial process is slow, costly, inefficient, and "prone to misconceive the public good." 265 New causes of action generally develop
in response to societal demand, but new causes of action are not
the only possible responses to legitimate social concerns. The na261. See Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 36-37,
407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (1978); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 379-81,
410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 108-09 (1978).
262. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1355, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979).
263. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 310, subd. 7 (MeKinney 1970 & Supp. 1978).
264. See, e.g., James v. Board of Educ., 42 N.Y.2d 357, 366 N.E.2d 1291, 397
N.Y.S.2d 934 (1977); Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 206 N.E.2d 174, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77
(1965).
An alternative form of the argument that existing administrative and legislative
practices are adequate is the argument that judicial determination of educational
malpractice claims would contravene democratic principles of government. This
argument is discussed by Elson, supra note 9, at 659-67, who attempts to rebut it.
But see Hazard, Courts in the Saddle: School Boards Out, 56 Plm DELTA KAPPAN
259 (1974); Glazer, Towards An Imperial Judiciary?,41 PuB. INTEREST 104 (1975);
A. BIcKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1977); D. HoRowrrz, supra note 248. The
argument is too detailed and philosophic to be discussed in this article. It should
be noted, however, that despite Professor Elson's discussion of it, the democratic
theory argument has been neither raised by the plaintiffs nor addressed by the
courts in any of the actual educational malpractice litigation.
265. American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538,
556 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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tionwide movement in state legislatures, state departments of education, and local school boards to adopt minimum competency
standards and tests is evidence both of the growing public concern for students graduating without minimal skills and of the capacity of non-judicial agencies to respond to that concern. 266
While the means of educational reform selected, minimum competency testing, may be subject to serious reservations, 2 67 the
point is that legislative or administrative institution of evaluative
and remedial programs obviates the need for judicial intervention, without leaving students remediless. So long as the legislatures are legislating, the problem of educational malpractice
should be left to legislation. The social importance of education
will be better served by political than by judicial solutions.
Educational impact. This becomes particularly manifest when
one examines, as have the courts, 2 6 8 the possible consequences
that the recognition of a cause of action for educational malpractice would have for the public schools. Permitting suits for nonlearning would have two primary effects. First, there would be
the additional costs that the already financially hard-pressed public school systems would be required to bear. The result would
likely be a further reduction in, rather than an improvement of,
educational services. Second, even were there no such reduction,
awarding damages for malpractice could have a number of disruptive impacts upon educational processes. In either case, the consequences would be undesirable.
Substantial damage awards would have a disastrous effect upon
finite and shrinking public school budgets.269 Originally, those
who advocated creating a cause of action for educational malpractice argued that "[a] school district is obviously a better loss
bearer than an individual student because it can pass on
whatever remedy is awarded to the general public in the form of
266. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1977, § 1, at 31, col. 5 (report on national enthusi-

asm for competency testing).
267. See notes 294-305 infra and accompanying text; McClung, Competency Testing: PotentialforDiscrimination,11 CLEARINGHOUSE 439 (1977).
268. E.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814,
825, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (1976); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47
N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979).
269. Regarding the size of the damage awards that educational malpractice
plaintiffs have already sought, see note 227 supra. The highly speculative nature

of such claims has, of course, been one of the reasons for the courts' dismissing
the suits for failure to state a cause of action. See notes 197, 198 & 227 supra.

increased taxes." 270 Today, only a few years after that was writ-

ten, the confident assertion about the general public's willingness
to sustain additional taxation has a faintly nostalgic ring. In the
face of public resistance to tax increases, heightened competition
for the remaining tax dollars available, and public hostility toward

the schools, 27 1 public education would almost certainly have to di-

minish still further the quality of its services. Nor would liability
insurance provide a panacea, for the premiums themselves would
272
have to come from the public revenues.
In addition to any damage awards, recognition of a cause of action for educational malpractice would present the schools with
other costs as well. Depending upon the remedy that a court
might select, a school district might be required to make extensive (and expensive) curricular changes or to introduce remedial
programs. Exactly how the situation would be resolved if the
school district could prove that it was not provided with adequate
273
funds to comply with such an order is difficult to predict.
Short of that, preparing and defending malpractice suits would
itself be a drain on the school system's resources. Particularly
would this be true, if the courts' fears of a flood of litigation were
to prove to be justified. In fact, even the advocates of an educational malpractice cause of action, themselves fearful of a major
fiscal outflow, have recommended only a limited damage
formula 274 or have sought to allay fears by arguing that recognition of the cause of action won't really result in very many suits
anyway. 275 "[I]t is probable that many potential plaintiffs will be
270. Comment, supra note 19, at 762. Note also that this sanguine asseveration
rests upon the unarticulated, but not unarguable, assumption that the student has,
in fact, suffered a loss. But see notes 190-98 supra and accompanying text.
271. See note 1 supra. Ironically, the very social psychological atmosphere out
of which the charges of educational malpractice have arisen is one of the data
courts should consider in making the policy determination of whether to allow for
such causes of action; see note 28 supra and accompanying text.
272. If, because of immunity from liability, see note 12 supra, a school district
could not be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for a teacher's
incompetence or for its own negligence in hiring the incompetent teacher, damages would necessarily have to be awarded against the teacher. In view of the niggardly awards that most public school teachers could sustain, this is obviously not
what most educational malpractice advocates would desire. Moreover, holding
teachers individually liable or requiring them to retain malpractice insurance
would have the undesirable effect of discouraging many from entering or remaining in the occupation. Attempts to pass on to the public teachers' insurance costs
through higher salaries would again require higher taxes and meet with the same
opposition.
273. A court effort to require adequate funding would amount to a judicial exercise of the appropriation power and would definitely raise questions of democratic
theory and the legitimacy of such an action; see note 264 supra.
274. E.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 594-95; Note, supra note 58, at 13, 36, 56.
275. Eg., Comment, supra note 8, at 587-88; Elson, supra note 9, at 652.

[voL. 18: 743, 1981]

EducationalMalpractice
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

from socially and economically deprived backgrounds, and thus
unlikely to bring suit because of their limited resources and relative alienation from the judicial system." 276 Apart from commenting upon the cynicism of such a position (and it is cynical in the
extreme), it must be noted that restricting the cause of action in
such a way that "many suits could be dismissed at the earliest
possible stage solely on the pleadings" 277 will still require the
schools to devote time, money, and effort to the preparation of
their pleadings. 278 This, in turn, will require shifting money and
personnel that would otherwise be available for instruction to the
detriment of the educational program. It was exactly these kinds
of fiscal considerations that led the Supreme Court to decline to
become involved in questions of educational finance,2 79 and the
lower courts should find them dispositive in the case of educational malpractice.
That would not be the case, were recognition of a cause of action for educational malpractice to improve the quality of the public schools.2 80 On balance, however, it appears unlikely that
holding educators liable for non-learning will result in improved
education. Particularized suits against individual teachers are
"probably not an effective approach to a general upgrading of education."28 1 On the other hand, broad-scale attacks upon school
districts or even whole school systems may produce instructional
behaviors or approaches to student evaluation that will be
counter-productive.
Conceptually, it is possible that malpractice litigation could
have a positive educational effect. The fear of lawsuits by dissatisfied students or their parents might deter negligent school administration, prevent the hiring of incompetent teachers, reform
276. Comment, supra note 8, at 588.
277. Id. at 587.
278. The assertion that "contributory negligence represents a viable response

to the floodgate argument" is subject to the same objections and is even weaker.
For one thing, the defense is not available in many jurisdictions. For another, the

existence of the defense is not likely to deter the hopeful plaintiff or the ingenious

plaintiff's counsel; and, even when the defense is available and successful, it will
require the expenditure of the schools' limited resources in defending the litigation.
279. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

280. For a survey of some of the educational benefits that would allegedly flow
from recognizing educational malpractice as a cause of action, see Elson, supra
note 9, at 657-59.
281. Comment, supra note 19, at 756.

classroom practices, and generally upgrade the quality of public
education. The likely reality, however, is otherwise. 282 Imposing
liability on school districts, educational administrators, and teachers will only encourage "defensive education."
As has been observed, the advocates of an educational malpractice cause of action are fond of drawing an analogy between education and medicine. 283 But permitting patients to sue doctors,
hospitals, and hospital administrators has not resulted in improved health care. 284 Apart from benefiting the sellers of liability
insurance, recognizing a cause of action for medical malpractice
has led to the practice of "defensive medicine," such as the administration of numerous, unnecessary tests.2 85 Teaching and administering the schools in the face of malpractice liability would
result in the same misallocation of resources.
It would also have the probable effect of discouraging many
qualified individuals from entering education as a career. Even if
the availability of malpractice insurance could reduce the fear of
financial liability, the prospect of being subjected to embarassing
courtroom proceedings would remain. And, were the courts actually to find educational malpractice in a few cases, the public
would probably draw the inference that incompetence was widespread in education, making the field even more unattractive.
The ironic result would be to diminish still further education's
claim to the status of profession. 286 Given the potential remuneration, people still become doctors, despite malpractice liability
and its negative connotations. But it is difficult to believe that
competent persons would choose to become educators if faced
with such prospects.
Malpractice liability's capacity for discouraging prospective educators would be heightened by the ambiguous nature of the
charge. The reformers and critics have yet to specify what conduct they see as constituting educational malpractice; or, conversely, their definitions are overly inclusive.2 87 If a student is
promoted without having attained the requisite skill level, that is
educational malpractice. But, if a student fails to progress, that,
too, may be educational malpractice. One advocate of educational
malpractice as a cause of action has complained that, in spite of
282. See Note, Implementation Problems in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 91
HARv. L. REV. 428 (1977).
283. See notes 11 & 237 supra.
284. Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine,
1971 DuKE L.J. 939.
285. Id.

286. See notes 141-48 supra and accompanying text.
287. See note 13 supra.
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the billions spent on education, 'twenty-three percent of all students fail to graduate from high school." 288 But, if educational
malpractice were recognized as a cause of action, presumably
even more will fail to graduate; the elimination of social promotions, coupled with the student's legal right to leave school after a
certain age, suggests that many will not secure diplomas. Were
such muddled analysis to become legal doctrine, educators would
be presented with an insoluble dilemma, damned if they did and
damned if they didn't. Thus, the critics' own confusion as to what
is meant by educational malpractice and its consequently discouraging effect upon those who might consider education as a career
is itself a strong policy argument against recognizing the cause of
action.
Additionally discouraging is the admission by some advocates
that educational malpractice suits not only could but also would
be used for purposes of harassment. 289 The object is not even
that the suits will be won. Litigation is simply to be used as a coercive device.
Tactically, therefore, even if ultimately lost on the merits, the lawsuit for
educational injuries serves the democratically supportive purpose of causing [education] officials...
to pay attention to grievances arising out of
2 90
the disputed practices.

Not only is it arguable that such do not serve "democratically supportive purposes" (particularly where the grievances are illegitimate, as presumably they would be if the suits are "lost on the
merits"), but also the impact on classroom decorum and student
discipline cannot be overlooked. In some schools, the students already come to class armed. Must they also come armed with a
lawsuit? One of the causes of educational malpractice is often
seen to be "crisis-laden" school systems. 29 ' It is difficult to see
how recognition of this new cause of action will diminish the crises.
Besides, disruption of the educational process can occur in
ways other than relaxation of school discipline or deterioration in
student-teacher relations. Yet one more negative impact that
would be probable to arise from allowing suits for educational
malpractice would be to inhibit experimentation in teaching tech288.
289.
290.
291.

Note, supra note 58, at 34.
E.g., Elson, supra note 9, at 664-67.
Id. at 666.
E.g., id. at 665.

niques. 292 Even a particularized holding that an individual
teacher's use of a specific experimental approach constituted malpractice, in view of the needs and abilities of that teacher's students, would have a general deterrent effect upon all other
teachers within that court's jurisdiction. These other teachers
will no doubt feel inhibited to some degree in using any new or
experimental technique, even if their students' academic capacities and needs are different than those of the losing teacher-defendant. After all, their students' ability to sue will be the same.
In terms of teaching practices, there is also an ironic, alternative risk presented by educational malpractice suits. The educational malpractice plaintiff would, in effect, be asking a court to
decide what instructional practices are legally acceptable. A decision in favor of the defendant would constitute a judicial statement implicitly--or, perhaps, even explicitly-legitimating the
challenged practice. It is not inconceivable that an idiosyncratic
judge might endorse a peculiar teaching practice which would
then be followed by educators in that jurisdiction (and, perhaps,
by educators in other jurisdictions as well) in order to protect
themselves and limit their own liability.
The optimism of the reformers that judicial intervention will
improve the quality of education appears, therefore, to be misplaced. At best, recognizing liability for educational malpractice
would create more uniformity in the quality of public education.
But it will be a uniformity achieved by reducing expectations of
student performance, enforcing minimal standards, and stultifying the experimentation that may lead to educational progress.
In fact, it may be argued that this is already the direction that
American educators have taken in response to the "accountability" movement.293 "Competency-based education" (CBE), the
current catchword in educational reform, may be little more than
a synonym for "defensive education." 2 94
The emphasis in competency-based education is upon achieve292. Possibly this problem could "be overcome by giving parents the choice of
putting their children in experimental classes; the doctrine of assumption of risk
would then allow experimentation undeterred by the threat of damages or dismissal." Comment, supra note 19, at 764. But see note 227 supra. Presumably, were
such a course of action open, school districts would then attempt to limit their liability by requiring parents to sign a blanket waiver as soon as their children enter
school The validity of such an instrument, however, is subject to serious doubt;
see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
293. Regarding "accountability," see notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
294. See generally Reilly, Competency-Based Educatiomn Pros and Cons, 14 AM.
EDUC. 21 (1978); Spady, Concept and Implication of Competency Based Education,
36 EDUC. LEADERS=IP 16 (1978); id., Competency-Based Education: A Bandwagon
in Search of a Definition, 6 EDUC. RESEARCHER 9 (1977).
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ment, rather than upon spending an arbitrarily prescribed
number of years within the school system. According to its ten-

ets, educational policymakers are to transform generalized expectations of student achievement into written "behavioral
objectives." These objectives reflect a general consensus as to the
level of ability that students at a particular grade level should exhibit in subjects such as reading, writing, and arithmetic. Almost
invariably, standardized tests are then used to assess whether
and how many students have attained the prescribed minimum
levels of proficiency. These tests results are, in turn, taken as a
measure of how well the schools are performing their public mandate to educate the students. 295 Some systems, in fact, have carried the emphasis upon test outcomes to its logical conclusion
and allow children, once they have attained a minimum age, to receive a high school diploma and leave school as soon as they have
passed the minimum competency tests. 296 For those who cannot
meet the basic skill requirements, remedial instruction is of297
fered.
The concept of competency-based education has proven so popular that in most states it is now legislatively mandated. 29 8 Like
most palliatives, however, it is deceptively seductive. 299 Where
school personnel are to be called to task for not meeting the specified goals, the intrinsic dynamic of the process encourages setting the goals as low as possible. Moreover, where the early-out
concept is employed, these minimum competency levels have a
way of becoming the behavioral maximums. In like manner,
competency-based education denigrates the arts and humanities.
The tests emphasize "life-role" skills, and the schools emphasize
the tests. Indeed, test-taking skills become the primary instructional focus, even though improved test scores do not necessarily
correlate with improved educational levels.
295. The process is described in L BROWDER, supra note 4, at 9-16.
296. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 85745 (West 1977); Fiske, Connecticut to Let
Students, 16, Quit High School Early, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
297. E.g., CAL. EDuC. CODE § 8574.5 (West 1977).
298. For a detailed, state-by-state summary of legislative action up to the time
of its publication, see Pipho, Minimum Competency in 1978: A Look at State Standards, 59 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 585 (1978); see also N.Y. Times Nov. 20, 1977, § 1, at 31,
col. 5.
299. Fiske, EducatorIs Criticalof Competency Tests, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1977,
§ 1, at 43, col. 1; Wise, The Hyper-rationalizationof American Education,35 EDUC.
LEADERSHIP 354 (1978). The criticisms of competency testing suggested in the following paragraph are explored more fully in these two articles.

Most seriously, minimum competency testing involves dangerous potentials for discrimination and violation of students' due
process rights. 300 The cultural biases inherent in most standardized tests raise serious question about, if they do not invalidate,
the use of such instruments to measure the educational achievement of minority group students or those from culturally disadvantaged backgrounds.301 Test questions are often irrelevant to
minority community experiences, while answers reflecting those
experiences receive no test credit. Extreme anxiety about poor
performance and lack of prior exposure to testing vocabulary are
also factors that can produce inaccurate test scores for minority
pupils. 302 Yet, without standardized tests, competency-based education would have to rely upon teachers' subjective appraisals,
evaluations that all too frequently may reflect personal bias and
30 3
prejudice.
In terms of a cause of action for educational malpractice, however, the principal difficulty with minimum competency testing is
that the courts might make test scores a measure of instructional
competence. Particularly in those states where competencybased education is established by statute, a court might take test
scores as establishing, for example, the necessary duty, standard
of care, and measure of injury to sustain a malpractice action
based on a negligence theory. 304 Ironically, then, rather than
avoiding judicial intervention, the establishing of minimum competency standards may invite increased litigation over academic
300. McClung, supra note 267; Lewis, Certifying FunctionalLiteracy: Competency Testing and Implicationsfor Due Process and Equal EducationalOpportunity, 8 J.L. & EDUC. 145 (1979); Clague, Competency Testing and Potential
Constitutional Challenges of "Everystudent," 28 CATHOIC U. L. REV. 469 (1979);

McClung, Competency Testing Program: Legal and EducationalIssues, 47 FoRtD.
L. REV. 651 (1979).
In addition, a problem with any test is, of course, the possibility that its results
will be misused; see IL LvymA, TEST ScoREs AND WHAT THEY MEAN (2d ed. 1971).
301. Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (passage of functional literacy examination as a prerequisite to receipt of high school diploma held
unconstitutional), noted in 10 Cum. L. REv. 863 (1980). See also Teicher, Minimum
Competency Test Requirements for High School Graduation: Are We Boxing in
Minority Students for a Lifetime of Failure?,8 HumN'RIGHTS 20 (1980).
302. Williams, Black Pride,Academic Relevance, and Individual Achievement,
in CRUCIAL ISSUES IN TESTING 13 (1974); J. LOEHLIN, G. LINDZEY & J. SPUHLER, RACE
DIFFERENCES IN INTELLIGENCE (1975); W. MEHRENS & i LEHMANN, STANDARDIZED
TESTS IN EDUCATION 341 (2d ed. 1975).

303. But cf. Goodman, supra note 181, at 33 (assessments by experienced
teachers who have daily contact with student more meaningful than testing devices).
304. See Note, Implicationsof Minimum Competency Legislation: A Legal Duty
of Care, 10 PAc. L. J. 947 (1979). Problems of establishing causation would, how-

ever, remain. Nor would minimum competency statutes provide any guidance as
to selection of an appropriate remedy or, if a monetary award were the remedial
device chosen, how to calculate the damages.
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instru.ction. 30 5 For the reasons already surveyed, however, the judiciary should decline to accept the invitation. 306 To make test
scores a measure of liability would only accelerate the already
undesirable trend toward defensive education, i.e. lower expectations, institute tests geared to those expectations, and then teach
to the tests.
Educators should be allowed to define for themselves the significance of student achievement tests with respect to teacher competence. 30 7 Presently, under the influence of the "accountability"
movement, test results are perhaps being given inappropriate
weight. But this does not argue that the judiciary should join the
movement. Legislative and administrative solutions have flex-

ibility to recommend them over judicial; and, once the ardor for
competency-based education has cooled, legislators and school
administrators can redress the balance. Unless the courts can produce better and not just the same solutions to the problems be-

setting American public education, they should stay their hand.
To argue in favor of judicial reluctance to assume the role of educational policymaker may strike some as quaint, in light of the
activist role courts have played in recent years on education issues. Judicial review has been afforded to many significant as-

pects of educational policy:
finance,

309

school desegregation, 308 school

school personnel practices, 31 0 and school discipline. 311

305. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1977, § 1, at 31, col. 6 (predicting such an increase).
Could selection of a particular test constitute educational malpractice? Can students sue to challenge the content of the test? Its scoring? The interpretation of
the scores?
306. But cf. Scheelhaase v. Woodbury Central Community School, 488 F.2d 237
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974) (implicitly endorsing school board's
use of student achievement tests as a measure of a teacher's competence).
307. Cf. id. (teacher competence and the standards for its measurement are peculiarly appropriate to local administration).
308. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189 (1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
309. See, e.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
310. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974); State Div. of Human Rights v. Westmoreland Central School Dist., 56 App.
Div. 2d 205, 392 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1977).
311. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).

But judicial involvement in other areas of school operation need
not justify involvement in questions of what should be taught in
the public schools and how.312 This area may be qualitatively different from those other areas where courts have intervened.3 13
Or, perhaps, judicial interference in those other areas has been
mistaken. 314 At the very least, the time has come to draw the
line.315

Such, indeed, has been the lesson the Supreme Court itself has
sought to teach during the past decade. In the Horowitz case,3 16
holding that a hearing was not constitutionally required before a
public medical school could dismiss a student for academic deficiencies, the Court wrote, "We decline to further enlarge the judicial presence in the academic community .... ,"317 Like the
decision to dismiss a student, determinations of academic quality
and instructional competence require experienced evaluations of
cumulative information not readily adapted to the procedural
tools of the judicial process. Rather, like educational finance, 318
312. In fact, the very scope of the judicial effort in other educational matters,
together with the reality that questions such as desegregation and school finance
are far from settled and will require continued judicial oversight for the foreseeable future, may constitute an argument against the courts' entertaining suits for
educational malpractice. As the late Professor Robert McCloskey, discussing another aspect of school-court interaction, put the matter some years ago,
On the basis of power and value considerations together, a strong case
could be made for judicial avoidance of the whole issue.... [TIhe evil in
its present manifestations is fairly moderate. Even so, judicial correction
of it might be warranted, if there were no other, graver wrongs simultaneously pressing for judicial attention and also taxing the power capacities
of the [courts]. But when we take into account that there are those other
wrongs, the price of dealing with this one may seem very dear indeed.
McCloskey, Principles,Powers, and Values: The Establishment Clause and the
Supreme Court, 1964 RELIGION AND THE PuBLIc ORDER 3, 28.
313. Cf. Comment, supra note 8, at 589 ("historical record does appear to favor
judicial noninterference"); Note, supra note 11, at 349 (courts have become involved in education issues only in the face of "a gross violation").
314. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 2; Note, supra note 188; D. HoRowrrz,
supra note 248; Hazard, supra note 264.
315. But of. Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 916-23 (1976) (catalogue of state court activism in
education).
316. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
The significance of Horowitz will depend upon whether lower courts confine it to
its facts or read it as a broad condemnation of judicial review of evaluative academic judgments.
317. Id. at 90. The most extreme statement of judicial restraint in cases involving the schools is to be found in Mr. Justice Powell's dissent in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 593-94 (1975). See also West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 652 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
318. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). But see
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); 18 Cal. 3d 728,
557 P.2d 929, 135 CaL Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Robinson v.
Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
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this is a subject best left to local citizen participation and control.

In Keyes v. School District No. 1, the Court also commented on
the issue of educational quality when it concluded that "communities deserve the freedom and incentive to turn their attention
and energies to [the] ... goal of quality education, free from protracted and debilitating battles over court-ordered student transportation" 3 1 9-and, one might add, over court-ordered adoption of
particular educational strategies.
V.

CONCLUSION

It would be fatuous to minimize the problems confronting
American public education. Admittedly among these, especially
in large urban school systems, is the problem of substandard instructional performance. But the common law is not the appropriate vehicle for correcting that problem. Whether based on
contract, misrepresentation, constitutional right, or negligence,
each of the legal theories thus far advanced to support a cause of
action for educational malpractice has proven, upon closer analysis, to be inadequate. In each instance, one or more of the requisite elements is lacking, and the proposed cause of action is, thus,
fatally defective.
It would be erroneous to ignore the evolutionary nature of the
law. But that evolution need not always be in the direction of
ever-increasing judicial involvement in educational policy. Courts
have not always behaved toward education as they are now behaving,320 nor need they continue to so behave.
Arguments, both sophisticated and sophistic, may be fashioned
by analogy to other, presently recognized causes of action. But
good and sufficient policy reasons sustain the courts' continued
refusal to recognize educational malpractice as a viable cause of
action. In contrast to the reformers' act of faith that judicial intervention in the guise of educational malpractice suits will improve
the quality of public education lies the reality that such actions
would more likely result in redirecting energies and funds away
3 21
from the educative function and into the defense of lawsuits.
319. 413 U.S. 189, 253 (1973).

320. See J. HOGAN, supra note 156, at 5-6 (identifying five separate and distinct
stages in the evolution of educational jurisprudence).

321. An alternative theory, suggested but not advanced here, is that recognition

of a cause of action for educational malpractice would simply amount to a judicial
attempt to prop up an obviously failing public school system. If the courts really

The nation's teachers and school boards perform an important
public function with limited resources. But, were educational
malpractice to be recognized as a cause of action, these same
teachers and boards could become the object of the animus of any
member of the community. Whatever benefit this might provide
to an individual plaintiff would be more than counterbalanced by
the detrimental impact upon the quality of education as a whole.
There appears to be no way to avoid such an outcome, short of excluding these suits completely. The "inability to perceive reasonable limits in

the area of ... recovery for educational

malpractice, combined with the virtually limitless possibilities of
harassment and burden upon the school system, if such suits are
allowed," 322 should result in the courts' continued foreclosure of
such litigation.

wanted to make a contribution to educational quality, so the theory would run,
they could do so by modifying existing equal protection and First Amendment
doctrine to make education vouchers, issued by the state and redeemable by any
school, a legally viable alternative. But see Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976); Wollman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). See generally King, Rebuilding the
"FallenHouse"-State Tuition Grantsfor Elementary and Secondary Education,
84 HARv. L. REV. 1057 (1971).
322. Diamond, supra note 57, at 151-52.

